Butwithoutaconstitutionallimitonitsduration，itmustbeconceded，thatapowerinthelegislaturetoprotractitsowncontinuance，wouldbedangerous。BlackstoneattributesthemisfortunesofCharlesI。tohishavingunadvisedlypassedanacttocontinuetheparliament，theninbeing，tillsuchtimeasitshouldpleasetodissolveitself，andthisisoneofthemanyproofsthatthemuchpraisedconstitutionofthatcountrywantsthecharacterofcertainty。NoactofcongresscouldprolongthecontinuanceofthelegislaturebeyondthetermfixedbytheConstitution。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterIIICHAPTERIII。OFTHESENATE。THEsenate，onaccountofitsmorepermanentdurationandvariousfunctions，willreceiveourfirstattention。
IftheinfusionofanyaristocraticqualitycanbefoundinourConstitution，itmustbeinthesenate；butitissojustlytemperedandregulatedbyotherdivisionsofpower，thatitexcitesnouneasiness。Themoundsandsafeguardswithwhichitissurroundedmustbeviolentlybrokendown，beforeanypoliticalinjurycanarisefromthesenate。
Thesenatorsareappointedfromtimetotime，bythelegislaturesofthedifferentstates；butifavacancyhappensduringtherecessofthestatelegislature，theexecutivethereofmaymaketemporaryappointmentsuntilthenextmeetingofthelegislature，whichshallthenfillsuchvacancies。
Thevestingthispowerinthestatelegislaturesistheonlymaterialremnantofthefederativecharacterofthelatecongress；butthedelegatesthenappointedpossessedthewholepower；thosenowappointed，holdbutapartofthepowersofthegeneralgovernment。Itisrecommendedbythedoubleadvantageoffavouringaselectappointment，andofgivingtothestategovernments，suchanagencyintheformationofthegeneralgovernmentaspreservestheauthorityoftheformer，andcontributestorenderthemlivingmembersofthegreatbody。1Whethertheappointmentshallbemadebyajointoraconcurrentvoteofthetwobranches，whenthelegislatureofastateconsistsoftwobranches，asitnowuniversallydoes，theConstitutiondoesnotdirect。Thedifferenceis，thatinajointvote，themembersofbothhousesassembletogetherandvotenumerically。Aconcurrentvoteistakenbyeachhousevotingseparately，andthevoteofonereceivingtheassentoftheotherbranch。
Thepersonappointedmustbeatleastthirtyyearsofage，havebeenacitizenoftheUnitedStatesnineyears，andatthetimeofhiselection，hemustbeaninhabitantofthestatebywhichheshallbechosen。Thesenatorialtrustrequiringgreatextentofinformationandstabilityofcharacter，amatureageisrequisite。Participatingimmediatelyinsomeofthetransactionswithforeignnations，itoughttobeexercisedbythosewhoarethoroughlyweanedfromtheprepossessionsandhabitsincidenttoforeignbirthandeducation。Thetermofnineyearsisareasonablemediumbetweenatotalexclusionofnaturalizedcitizens，whosemeritsandtalentsmayclaimashareofpublicconfidence，andanindiscriminateandhastyadmissionofthem，whichmightpossiblycreateachannelforforeigninfluenceinthenationalcouncil。2
Eachstate，whethermoreorlesspopulous，appointstwosenators?anumberwhichwouldhavebeeninconvenient，ifthevotesinthesenateweretaken，asintheformercongress，bystates，when，ifthedelegatesfromastatewereequallydivided，thevoteofthestatewaslost；andwhichofcourserenderedanunevennumberpreferable:butinthesenate，anumericalvoteistakeninallcases，andthedivisionofopinionamongthosewhorepresentparticularstates，hasnoinfluenceinthegeneralresult。Ifthesenateshouldbeequallydivided，thecastingvoteisgivenbytheVicePresident，whoseofficeitistopresideinthesenate。Theequalityofstatesinthisrespect，isnotperhapsdefensibleontheprincipleofrepresentingthepeople，whichoughtalwaystobeaccordingtonumbers；
butitwastheresultofmutualconcessionandcompromise，inwhichthepopulousstates，enjoyingtheadvantagesofproportionalnumbersinthehouseofrepresentatives，bywhichtheyareenabledtocontroltheinterestsofthesmallerstates，yieldedasacompensation，theprincipleofequalityinthisbranchofthelegislature，whichenjoysinmostrespectsequal，insomerespectsgreaterpowers。
Nootherpoliticalleagueorcommunityisknowntohavepossessedaswiseadjustmentofitscapacitiesandqualities。InEurope，differentstatesorcitieshavealwaysstoodasindividualmembersoftheleague，andthemajoritywhichdecided，wasthemajorityoftheleague，notoftherepresentativeswhoattended。Thiscompositionofbothispeculiartoourcountry，andhasbeenfoundinpractice，neitherproductiveofschismnordeficientinenergy。Aperfectindependenceofsentimenthasbeenuniformlymanifestedbythemembers，andgreatsuperioritytolocalinterestsandimpressions，particularlysoughtforinthesenate，hasalwaysbeenfoundthere。
Itmaynotbeimpropertoobserveinthisplace，thatsomeofthestatelegislaturesappeartohaveviewedtherelativedutiesofthesenatorswhomtheyhaveappointed，inamorerestrictedlightthanitisapprehendedtheConstitutionimplies。Itseemstohavebeensupposedthatthesenatorswereboundtoobeythedirectionsofthestatelegislatures，andthelanguageofsomeresolutionshasbeen，thatthesenatorsbe\"instructed，\"andthemembersofthehouseofrepresentativesfromtheparticularstates\"requested，\"
tomakeorsupportcertainpropositions。Butsurelytheopinioniserroneous。
Asenatorisnomoreboundtoobeytheinstructionsofthestatelegislature，inoppositiontohisownjudgment，thanarepresentativeofthepeopleintheotherhouse，isboundbytheoccasionalinstructionsofhisconstituents。
Theyarebothelectedforthepurposeoffreelyandhonestlyexercisingtheirownjudgmentsaccordingtothebestoftheircapacities。
Themomenttheytaketheirseats，theycommencethetaskoflegislatingfortheUnion，includingthestatefromwhichtheyaredelegated，whosepeculiarinterestsanddesires，itmayoftenbenecessarytopostponetothegeneralbenefit。Onthecontrary，thestatecontemplatesandurgesitsowninterests；itsinhabitantsortheelectoralsectionsofitsinhabitants，inlikemanner，considerandpursuetheirs，anditisperfectlyproperthattheyshouldberepresentedtoanddirectlypressedupon，thepersonssodelegated。But，thepowersandthedutiesofthosedelegatesareessentiallyalteredifsuchrequestsareconvertedintobindinginstructions。Inrespecttosenators，theimproprietyofthemeasureseemspeculiarlystriking。
Ifonestatepossessesarighttodirectthevotesofitssenators，everyotherstatemusthavethesameright，andifeverystateweretoexercisesuchright，noportionofthelegislativepowerwouldreallyresideinthesenate，butwouldbeheldbythestates；thusrelapsingintotheprinciplesoftheoldconfederation，orfallingintosomethingworse。
Theappointmentofasenatorisforsixconsecutiveyears，butifavacancyhappens，anappointmentismadebytheexecutiveofthestate，fortheproportionofthetermofservicewhichremains。UnderthedirectionoftheConstitution，thesenatorswereattheirfirstmeetingdividedintothreeclasses:theseatsofthoseofthefirstclasstobevacatedattheendoftwoyears，ofthesecondclassattheendoffour，andofthethirdattheendofsixyears；thereasonofwhichwas，thatthesenateshouldalwayscontinueapermanentbody。Thehouseofrepresentatives，attheexpirationoftwoyearsisatanend:anewhouse，thoughitmayconsistofthesamemembers，thensucceeds；butthepublicservicerequires，formanypurposes，thatthereshouldalwaysbeasenate。InexecutingthedirectionsoftheConstitution，itwassoarranged，thattwosenatorsfromthesamestate，shouldnotgooutatthesametime。
Thesenateatfirstsatwithcloseddoors，butitwasafterwardsconceivedtobemoreconformabletothegeniusofafreecountry，thatthedeliberationsofboththelegislativebodiesshouldbeopenlyconducted，withtheexception，however，ofitsconsiderationoftreatiesandappointmentstoofficesonthePresident\'snomination。
Onthesepoints，theirdeliberationswouldbeveryimproperlyexposedtopublicnotice；thenationalinterestisbetterpromotedbywaitingfortheresult。
Amajorityofthesenateconstitutesaquorum；thatis，amajorityofthemembersofthesenate，notamajorityofthestates。Thepoweroflegislationmightthereforebesuspendedbythewilfulabsenceofamajority；butwhateffectthiswouldhaveonthegovernment，inotherrespects，willhereafterbeconsidered。
Inrespecttothesinglefunctionoflegislation，adeepandseriousdiscussionmightbehadonapointwhichhasnotyetoccured，anditisferventlyhopedmayneverariseinthiscountry。Ifthelegislaturesofamajorityofthestatesweretoomitorrefusetoappointsenators，thequestionwouldbe，whetherthemajorityofthosewhowereactuallyinoffice，excludingfromthecomputationthenumbertowhichthenon-appointingstateswereentitled，wouldbesufficient，withinthespiritoftheconstitution，toupholdthelegislativepower。Itissufficienttostate，withoutpresumingtodecidethequestion。
1。Federalist，No。62。Theauthoravailshimselfofthefirstoccasiontoquotethisexcellentwork，touniteinthegeneralhomagethathasbeenpaidtoit。TheletterssignedPubliusweretheproductionofthreeenlightenedstatesmen，Jay，Madison，andHamilton。
TheywerecollectedandpublishedunderthetitleoftheFederalist，andcontainthesoundestprinciplesofgovernment，expressedinthemosteloquentlanguage。
2。Federalist，No。62。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterIVCHAPTERIV。OFTHEHOUSEOFREPRESENTATIVES。THEhouseofrepresentativeswasfoundedontheprincipleoftherepresentationofthepeople；yetnotpurelyandabstractedly，butwithasmuchconformitytoitaswaspracticable。
Itiscomposedofrepresentativesofthepeopleoftheseveralstates，notofthepeopleatlarge；andinthisrespectthereisstillsomethingofafederativequality。Ifthewholehadbeenthrownintoonemass，itwouldcertainlyhavebeenmoreconsistentwithafullrepresentationoftheentirepeople，butmanywouldhavebeentheobjectionstoit。Itwouldhavebeendesirablethatthequalificationsoftheelectorsshouldbeuniform，butconsiderablevarietyofopinionandpracticeinthisrespectexists。
Insomestates，thesystemofuniversalsuffrageprevails；inothersafreeholdorotherestateisrequiredofmoreorlessvalue。Residenceforalongerorshortertimeisrequisiteindifferentstates，andwhentheconstitutionwasframed，differentqualificationswererequiredintwoofthestatesforelectorsofthedifferentbranchesofthelegislativebody。Thepeopleofeachstatewerenaturallyattachedtotheirowninstitutions，andwouldunwillinglyhavesurrenderedtheminfavourofothers。Indeed，ifthequalificationofpropertyhadbeenrequired，thepeopleofthosestateswhereinuniversalsuffragewasestablished，wouldprobablyhaverefusedaltogethertoaccedetotheUnion。
Again。Iftherepresentativesweretobeallchosenbyageneralticket，theconsequenceswouldbethatthousandsofvotersmustgivetheirsuffragesinfavourofpersonsofwhomtheyhadnoknowledge。Ifitwasrequiredthatthecandidateshouldresideinaparticulardistrict，theinhabitantsofGeorgiawouldeitherhavetoselectaresidentofMassachusettsontheirownjudgment，orimplicitlyfollowthesuggestionsofthevotersinMassachusetts。
Underthesedifficultiestheprincipleofexactrepresentationwasnecessarilyabandoned，andinlieuofit，representationwasapportionedamongtheseveralstates。Themediumofnotmorethanonerepresentativefor30，000inhabitants，wasfirstagreedon，andisafundamentalpartofthesystembywhichtheinhabitantsofeverystate，althoughitmightpossessafractionalparthoweverlargeof30，000，consentedtorelinquishthebenefitoftheultranumber。Buteverystateistoberepresented；andifanyoneshouldbycasualtiesbereducedbelowthatnumber，sheisstilltohaveonerepresentative，asshewillstillretaintwomembersofthesenate。1
Atonetimeitwasconceivedbycongress，thatwithoutinvadingtheconstitution，theprincipleofapportionmentmightbereformedtoadvantage。
Theobjectwastopreventthelossinthenumberofrepresentativesarisingfromthefractionalparts。
Withasoundpoliticalviewtoretainthejustrelationofrepresentationtonumbers，itisprovidedintheConstitution，thatwithinthreeyearsanactualenumerationshouldbemadeoftheinhabitantsoftheUnitedStates，whichshouldberepeatedeverytenyears。Infixingthenumberofthefirsthouseofrepresentatives，thepopulationwasestimated，notascertained。
Whenthecensus，(asitisnowcommonlytermed，)wastakenin1790，itappearedthat，inmanystates，therewouldbeconsiderablefractionalparts，which，whetherthequotientwasfixedat30，000，oragreaternumber，wouldbeunrepresented。Toincreasethenumberofthehouseofrepresentativesasfarastheconstitutionwouldpermit，wasdeemed
mostconducivetothepublicsecurity，againstthepreponderancyofexecutiveinfluence，whichhoweverwasdeniedandresistedbyaconsiderableminority。Abill，aftergreatstruggles，passedbothhouses，whichitseemsdifficulttoreconciletotheConstitution。
Thewholenumberofinhabitantsaccordingtotherecentcensusbeingascertained，itwasdividedby30，000，andproducedthenumberofonehundredandtwentyrepresentatives，whichwere，inthefirstplace，apportionedamongtheseveralstates，untilasmanyrepresentativesasitwouldgivewereallottedtoeach。Theresiduarynumbersweredistributedamongthestateshavingthehighestfractions。Butthecorrectandindependentmindoftheillustriousmanwhothenheldtheofficeofpresident，rejectedthebill。Itwasreturnedtothehouseofrepresentatives，withtheobservation，thattheConstitutionhadprovidedthatthenumberofrepresentativesshouldnotexceedonefor30，000，whichistobeappliedtotherespectivenumbersofthestates，andthebillallottedtoeightofthestatesmorethanonefor30，000。
Astherewasnotaconstitutionalmajoritytopassitagain，theeffortfailed，andprobablywillneverberenewed。Anotherlawwasimmediatelypassed，allottingonememberto33，000inhabitants，whichstillleftsomefractionalpartsunrepresented。
Thesameobjectionalsoexistsintherepresentativebodiesofstates，wheretheapportionmentismadeamongcounties?butastatelegislaturepossessesthepowerofenlargingorreducingcounties，andofaddingtwoormoretogether，whereastheUnitedStateshavenopowertoaltertheboundariesofastate，althoughtheymaygivetheirassenttoanalterationbythestateitselftheenumeration，atstatedintervals，asrequiredbytheConstitutionis，likemanyotherpartsofit，deservingofpraisebothforitswisdomanditsnovelty。ItisnottobefoundintheConstitutionofanyoftheEuropeangovernments，andifoccasionallypractised，itisnotobligatoryonthemtocontinueit。
ThecensusofRomewasdirectedbyalawpassedthreehundredyearsafterthecommencementofthestatewasoccasionallyintermitted，andfinallyabolished；buttheinstitutionitselfwasratherofamilitarythanarepresentativecharacter。
Byconformingtherepresentationtotheactualnumberofcitizens，asitisascertainedfromtimetotime，theevilsexperiencedinthecountry，towhich，onaccountofitsbearingthegreatestresemblancetoourcivilpolity，wesofrequentlyallude，areavoided。ThedeclineofpopulationinsomepartsofEngland，anditsincreaseinothers，haveproducedtheutmostinequalityintheformationoftheirhouseofcommons。London，whichcontainsaboutone-seventhoftheinhabitantsofEngland，isentitledtosendfourmemberstoparliament。TheinconsiderableunitedboroughofWeymouthandMelcombeRegis，containingseventeenhundredinhabitants，sendsthesamenumber。ManchesterandBirmingham，twoverypopuloustowns，havenorepresentatives，whilethesmalldesertedboroughofOldSarum，withoutahouseoraninhabitant，isthevehiclethroughwhichtwomembersobtaintheirseats；thelargestcountyinthekingdomsendsonlytwo。
Thusarigidadherencetoanancientsystemofrepresentation，whichmayperhapshavebeennotunsoundatthetimeitwasformed，isnowproductiveofthegrossestabuses。Thename，thetegumentarepreserved，whenthesubstancethatoughttobeenclosed，isalmostentirelygone。
Thebeneficialeffectsofoursystemwillappearbyreferringtothefollowingtabularview，in，whichtheincreaseofgeneralpopulationmaybededucedfromtheincreasednumberofrepresentativesfrommostofthestates。TABLE。
STATES。NumberofRepresentatives。
Florida——1Thereis，however，oneanomalyinoursystemwithwhichwearesometimesreproached。Therepresentativeproportionsaremadetodependonaddingtothewholenumberoffreepersonsineachstate，includingthoseboundtoserviceforatermofyears，andexcludingIndiansnottaxed，three-fifthsofallotherpersons，thatis，thatfifteenslavesshallbeconsideredasequalintheratioofrepresentationtoninefreemen。
Itwouldnowbeunseasonableanduselesstoconsiderortoanswertheargumentsoneitherside。Ithasbeenagreedto，andthequestionisforeveratrest。
Itonlyremainstoobserve，thattoguardagainstarefractorydisposition，shoulditeverariseinthelegislaturesofthestates，inrespecttothetimes，places，andmannerofholdingelectionsforsenatorsandrepresentatives，congressisempoweredatanytime，tomakeoralterbylawsuchregulations，exceptastotheplaceofchoosingsenators。Thisexceptionwasproper，ascongressoughtnottohavethepowerofconveningthestatelegislatureatanyotherthanitsusualplaceofmeeting。Wehavealreadyobserved，thatwhentheConstitutionwasadopted，differentqualificationswereprescribedinsomeofthestatesforelectorstotheirdifferentlegislativebranches。Asthehouseofrepresentativesisthemostnumerousbranchofthegenerallegislature，itwasjudiciouslyprovidedthattheelectorsofitshouldhavethequalificationsrequisitefortheelectorsofthemostnumerousbranchofthestatelegislature。
Whenvacancieshappen，theexecutiveauthorityofthestate，issueswritsforelectionstobeholdentofillthem。
Boththesenateandhouseofrepresentativespossesstheusualpowerstojudgeoftheelections，returnsandqualificationsoftheirownmembers，andtopunishthemfordisorderlybehaviour，whichmaybecarriedtotheextentofexpulsion，providedtwo-thirdsconcur。
Ithasnotyetbeenpreciselysettledwhatmustbethedisorderlybehaviourtoincurpunishment，norwhatkindofpunishmentistobeinflicted；butitcannotbedoubtedthatmisbehaviouroutofthewallsofthehouseorwithinthem，whenitisnotinsession，wouldnotfallwithinthemeaningoftheConstitution。
Expulsionmay，however，befoundedoncriminalconductcommittedinanyplace，andeitherbeforeorafterconvictioninacourtoflaw。
Butapowerextendingbeyondtheirownprecincts，andaffectingothersthantheirownmembers，hasbeenexercisedbybothhouses，andhasbeendecidedinthesupremecourttobeconstitutional。
Itisamaximinthepracticalapplicationofgovernment，thatthepublicfunctionariesshouldbesupportedinthefullexerciseofthepowersintrustedtothem。Attemptstobribeortointimidatethemconstituteoffencesagainstthepublic。Theyamounttomorethancontemptsorbreachesofprivilegeagainst。thelegislativebodies，andtheyundoubtedlysubjecttheoffenderstotheusualcourseofprosecutionandpunishmentinthecourtsoflaw。
Butthisliabilitydoesnotexcludetheimmediatejurisdictionofthelegislativebody，whichissupportedbystrongconsiderationsofpublicpolicy。Thepeopleareentitledtotheutmostpurityandintegrityintheconductoftheirrepresentatives。Thehouseisaguardianofthepublicinterestsinthisrespect。Itisitsdutytomakeimmediateinquiryastoanyattempttoassailthefreedomorcorrupttheintegrityofanyofitsmembers。Fromthedutytoinquirearisestherighttopunish；itneedsnottobedevolvedontheordinarytribunals。ItistruethatnopowertothiseffectisexpresslygivenbytheConstitution，nordoesthejudicialorcriminalpowergiventothecourtsoftheUnitedStatesinanypart，expresslyextendtotheinflictionofpunishmentforsuchoffences。Butitisnotthereforetobeinferredthatnosuchpowerexistsanywhere。IfthecourtsoftheUnitedStateswouldpossessitbyimplication，thereisnoreasonforrefusingittothelegislativebodyitself，unlessitshouldbediscoveredtobewhollyinconsistentwiththeconstructionornatureofthatbody，orwithsomeclauseintheConstitution。Butthereverseofthefirstpositionisthetruth。Itwouldbeinconsistentwiththenatureofsuchabodytodenyitthepowerofprotectingitselffrominjuryorinsult。Ifitsdeliberationsarenotperfectlyfree，itsconstituentsareeventuallyinjured。Thispowerhasneverbeendeniedinanycountry，andisincidentaltothenatureofalllegislativebodies。Ifitpossessessuchapowerinthecaseofanimmediateinsult，ordisturbancepreventingtheexerciseofitsordinaryfunctions，itisimpossibletodenyitinothercases，whichalthoughlessimmediateorlessviolent，partakeofthesamecharacter，byhavingatendencytoimpairthefirmandhonestdischargeofpublicduties。
ThoseclausesintheConstitutionwhichprovidethatthetrialofallcrimesshallbebyjury，inthestateanddistrictwheretheoffencehasbeencommitted，areevertobeheldsacred?butitwouldbedoingviolencetothemtocarrythemfurtherthantheplainmeaning，thattrialbyjuryshallbepreservedincriminalprosecutionsintheordinarycourts；otherwiseitwouldbeimpossibletosupportthejurisdictiongiventothesenateincasesofimpeachment，whereinnotrialbyjurytakesplace。Itappearsthenthatthisimpliedpowerofpunishingwhataretermedcontemptsandinfringementsoftheprivilegesofthehouses，isinrealitytheusefulinstitutionofasummaryjurisdictionforthepunishmentofoffencessubstantiallycommittedagainstthepeople，andthatitiscorrectlydeducedfromtheConstitution。
Thefollowingexpressprovisions，whichrequirenoelucidation，areinsertedtoclosethispartofthesubject?
Amajorityofeachhouseshallconstituteaquorumtodobusiness，butasmallernumbermayadjournfromdaytodayandmaybeauthorizedtocompeltheattendanceofabsentmembersinsuchmannerandundersuchpenaltiesaseachhousemayprovide。
Neitherhousewithouttheconsentoftheothershalladjournformorethanthreedays，nortoanyotherplacethanthatinwhichthetwohousesshallbesitting。
Eachhouseshallkeepajournalofitsproceedings，andfromtimetotimepublishthesame，exceptingsuchpartsasmayintheirjudgmentsrequiresecrecy，andtheyeasandnaysofthemembersofeitherhouseshall，atthedesireofone-fifthofthosepresent，beenteredonthejournal。
1。Inthearticlesofconfederationitwasalsoafundamentalprovisionthateachstateshouldhaveonevote，(art。iv，)andthiswasmadeanexpressconditionintheinstructionsgivenbythestateofDelawaretoitsdelegatesintheconventionof1787。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterVCHAPTERV。OFTHEPRESIDENT\'SPARTICIPATIONINTHELEGISLATIVEPOWER。THEpresidentpartakesofthelegislativepowerunderwiseandcautiousqualifications，founded，asthewholeframeofourgovernmentisfounded，ontheirtendencytopromotetheinterestsofthepeople。Hedoesnotoriginatelawsorresolutions；
hetakesnopartinthedeliberationsonthemduringtheirprogress；hedoesnotactinrelationtothemindirectlybyadviceorinterferenceofanysort，untiltheyhavepassedbothhouses:itisonlywhentheiroperationsareconcludedthathispowerbegins。
Aviewofhisotherfunctionswillbelongtootherpartsofthiswork，butaspreparatorytothewhole，itisnecessarytosetforththemannerofhisbeingelected。
Tocallanindividualfromprivatelifeinorderthathemaypresideovertheinterestsofmillions；toinvesthimwiththevariousdignifiedfunctions，andtheextensivepatronagewhichappertaintoastationsoexalted；tosecureascompletelyaspossible，thefreeexerciseofthepeople\'srights；todiscourageandpreventtheartificesofparty，andofindividualambition；andtoaccomplishallthisbymeansofafixedandpracticablesystemwhichshouldneitherbemisunderstood，pervertednorresisted，wasataskofnosmalldifficulty。
Hereditarysuccessionhasitsadvocatesamongtheloversofpeaceandregularity；andtheturbulentelectionsofPolandhaveoftenbeenquotedbythosewhodidnotdistinguishbetweenamilitaryaristocracyandawellorderedrepublic。Butwehadamongourselvesmoreappropriateexamplesintheelectionsofthegovernorsofstates，whichanexperience，shortbutsatisfactory，pointedoutasmodelsthatmightbecarefullyconsulted。
Theimmenseterritoryoverwhichthisofficerwastopreside，thepopulationalreadygreat，andannuallyincreasingbeyondtherelativegrowthofmostothercountries，thedivisionsofstates，eachseparateandindependent，andthenecessityofadmittingtosomeextentthesensationsoflocalidentityevenintheactofgeneralandconsentaneoussuffrages，suggestedcertaincombinationsoftheelectivefacultywhichinasinglestatewouldbeuselessandunwieldy。
Toeffectthesepurposes，anexcellenttheorywasadopted。Eachstateistoappointinsuchmannerasthelegislaturemaydirect，anumberofelectorsequaltothewholenumberofsenatorsandrepresentativestowhichthestatemaybeentitledincongress，andtheseelectorsaretochoosethePresident，andVicePresidentbyballotonly。
Inthusfixingtheproportionalnumberofelectors，weperceiveadueattentiontothepreservationofthestatecharacter，withoutimpairingtheuniversalityofactionincidenttotheelectionitself。
Thepeopleofeachstatehadcreatedtheirrespectivelegislaturesaccordingtotheformsoftheirownconstitutions。Thoselegislaturesaretodirectinwhatmannertheelectorsshallbeappointed，andthereisnorestrictionupontheminthisrespect，becauseitisoneofthoseinstancesinwhichitwasrighttoleaveacertainfreeagencytothestate。
Wehaveseenthatintheappointmentofsenators，thestateactsbythelegislaturealone。Thelegislaturecannotdivestitselfofthedutyofchoosingsenatorswhentheoccasionrequiresit。Itcannotdevolvethechoiceuponelectorsoronthepeople。
Butthedutiesofthesenatethoughdignifiedandexalted，arenotsovariousasthoseofthepresident。Theirparticipationintheexecutivebusinessissmallandatuncertainintervals。Thepresidentcomesintodailycontactwiththepeople，byhisdailyexecutivefunctions，yetitwasconceivedthathemightfeelagreaterdependenceonthepeoplethanthepublicinterestswouldwarrant，ifhiselectionsprungimmediatelyfromthem。Ontheotherhand，ifhiselectiondependedentirelyonthelegislatures，itwouldcarrythestatecharacterbeyonditsreasonablebearings，andcreateasenseofdependencyonthemalone，insteadofarelationtothepeopleatlarge。Undertheoldconfederation，thepresidentwaschosenbythemembersofthecongress，andnotbythestatelegislatureswhoappointedthosemembers。
Fromthesecoincidencesitwasfoundexpedientthatheshouldowehiselection，neitherdirectlytothepeople，nortothelegislaturesofstates，yetthattheselegislaturesshouldcreateaselectbody，tobedrawn。fromthepeople，whointhemostindependentandunbiassedmanner，shouldelectthepresident。Astheelectionwouldthusineffectbecomeinacertainsense，thecombinedactofthelegislaturesandofthepeople，itwasfurtherconsideredthatwhilethelatterwerethusbroughtintoaction，thestatecharacterwasfurthertobemaintained，andhencetwoelectorswere，atallevents，tobesecuredtoeachstate。Thusasanequalrepresentationinthesenatewasalreadysecuredtoeachstate，howeversmallthestatemightbe，acertaindegreeofrespectabilityandeffectwasalsosecuredtothesmalleststate，inthenumberofelectors。Thisconcessiontothesmallstatescouldnot，however，beallowed，withoutallowingitalsotothelargest，sinceallareconstitutionallyequal。
Themannerinwhichthesegreatobjectsweretobeeffectedisnowtobeexhibited。
Itisdirectedthattheelectorsshallmeetintheirrespectivestates。
Theparticularplaceofmeetingisproperlytobefixedbythelegislature，butitcannotbeoutofthestate；ifthelegislatureshouldinadvertentlyordesignedlyomittodesignatetheplaceofmeeting，orifanymoralorphysicalcauseshouldrenderitimpossiblefortheelectorstoassemblethere，nothingappearsintheConstitutiontopreventthemfrommeetingataplaceoftheirownchoice。
Theelectionistobebyballot，themodeofproceedingbestcalculatedtosecureafreedomofchoice。
Ofthetwopersonsvotedfor，oneatleastshallnotbeaninhabitantofthesamestatewiththeelectors。Thevotesbeingtransmittedtothesenateweretobeopenedbyitspresidentinthepresenceofthesenateandhouseofrepresentatives。Thepersonhavingthegreatestnumberofvoteswastobepresidentifsuchnumberwasamajorityofthewholenumberofelectorsappointed，andiftherewasmorethanonewho，hadsuchmajorityandhadanequalnumberofvotes，thehouseofrepresentativeswereimmediatelytochoosebyballotoneofthemforpresident。Ifnopersonhadamajority，thehouseshouldinlikemannerchoosethepresidentoutofthefivehighestonthelist。Thevotesofthehouseweretobetakennotindividually，butbystates，therepresentativesfromeachstatehavingonevote。Aquorumtoconsistofamemberormembersfromtwo-thirdsofthestates，andamajorityofallthestateswasnecessaryforachoice。
Themodeofproceedingwassomewhatdifferentastothevicepresident。
Afterthechoiceofthepresident，thepersonhavingthegreatestnumberofvoteswastobevicepresident。Ifthereremainedtwoormorewhohadanequalnumberofvotes，thesenateandnotthehouse，weretochoosefromthembyballotthevicepresident，andasitisnotdirectedthatinthisrespecttheyshallvotebystates，itfollowsthattheyvoteindividuallyasinordinarycases。
Suchwastheoriginalplanoftheconstitution，butithasbeenusefullyalteredbyprovidingthattheballotsoftheelectorsshallbeseparatelygivenforpresidentandvicepresident，andthatthevicepresidentshallbeelected，asinthecaseofthepresident，byamajorityofthewholenumberofelectorsappointed。
Thenumberofcandidatesoutofwhomtheselectionistobemadebythehouseofrepresentatives，isreducedfromfivetothree。Thesenateinrespecttovicepresidentisconfinedtothetwohighestinvotes。
Inregardtothefinalchoiceofthepresident，itwasdeemedexpedientthatthehouseofrepresentativesshouldvotebystates，becausetherewouldalwaysbereasontosupposethatifthepeopleatlargeweremuchdividedinopinion，theirimmediaterepresentativeswouldbeincapableofcomingtoadecision，andnoothermodeofremovingthedifficultyoccuredthaninthismannertoreferittothestates。Inthesenate，wheretherepresentationisequal，thesameinconveniencewasnottobeapprehended，andbyreducingtheultimatecandidatestoasmallernumber，thosewhorepresentedstatesinwhichthevoteshadbeenlost，wouldbemuchlessinfluenced，evenifsuchinfluenceexistedatall。
Anotherbenefitalsoresultedfromit。Bythefirstmodeofproceedingthesenatewasrestrainedfromactinguntilthehouseofrepresentativeshadmadetheirselection，whichifpartiesranhigh，mightbeconsiderablydelayedbytheamendment，thesenatemayproceedtochooseavicepresidentimmediatelyonreceivingthereturnsofthevotes。Ifundertheoldmode，thehouseofrepresentativesdidnotchooseapresidentbeforethefourthdayofMarchnextensuing，thevicepresidenttheninofficewastoactaspresident。Sothatalthoughthepublicconfidencemighthavebeenwhollywithdrawnfromhim，hewouldbecomepresidentineffectwhereasonthepresentplan，ifnopresidentiselectedbythehouseofrepresentatives，thevicepresidentwhowillfilltheoffice，willhavethefreshsuffragesofthepeople。
Sofarthereforeasrelatestothispartoftheplanforchoosingthepresidentandvicepresident，thearrangementseemsnowsettledasjudiciouslyasthenatureofourconstitutionwilladmit，althoughonedifficultyDotprovidedfor，maypossiblysomedayoccur。Ifmorethanthreeofthosehighestinvotesforpresident，orthantwoofthosevotedforasvicepresidentshouldbeequalinnumberofvotes，itisnotdirectedhowtheselectionshallbemade。Intheoriginaltextitisdeclared，thatthevotesofthehouseofrepresentativesandthesenateshallbebyballot，and。soitstillcontinuesastothehouseofrepresentatives，butitisnotdirectedintheamendment，howthevotesofthesenateshallbegiven。
Itisprobable，however，thatavotebyballot，wouldbeadopted。
Atpresent，(1824，)theelectorsarechosenbythepeopleinseventeenoutofthetwenty-fourstates，eitherbyageneralticket，orindistrictsfixedbythelegislature。Intheremainingseven，thelegislaturehasreservedtoitselfthepowerofappointingthem。Theformermodeseemsmostcongenialwiththenatureofourgovernment，andthepopularcurrentnowsetssostronglyinfavourofit，thatthepracticewillprobablybecomegeneral。1
Vacanciesintheofficeofpresidentareprovidedfor。\"Incaseoftheremovalofthepresidentfromoffice，orofhisdeath，resignationorinabilitytodischargethepowersanddutiesoftheoffice，itshalldevolveonthevicepresident，\"andcongressshallhavepowertoprovidefortheconcurrentvacanciesofboth。
Thispowerhasbeenexecutedbyauthorizingthepresidentprotemporeofthesenatetoperformthosefunctions。Thepresidentprotemporeofthesenateischosenbythesenateduringtheabsenceofthevicepresident，orwhenheexecutestheofficeofpresident，andithasbecomeusualforthevicepresidenttoretirefromthesenateafewdaysbeforethecloseofthesession，inorderthatapresidentprotemporemaybechosen，tobereadytoactonemergencies。Ifhoweverthereshouldhappentobevacanciesinallthesethreerespects，thespeakerofthehouseofrepresentativesisnextempoweredtoassumetheofficeofpresident，andbeyondthisnoprovisionhasbeenmade。
Ifthevicepresidentsucceedstotheofficeofpresident，hecontinuesinittilltheexpirationofthetimeforwhichthepresidentwaselected；
butifboththoseofficesarevacant，itbecomesthedutyofthesecretaryofstatetotakemeasuresfortheelectionofapresident。
Theeffectofthelastamendmenthasnotbeenadvertedtobycongress。
AstheConstitutionnowstandsavicepresidentcannotbeelectedtilltheregularperiod。
Notificationistobegiven，aswelltotheexecutiveofeachstateasinoneatleastofthepublicnewspapersprintedineachstate，thatelectorsofapresidentshallbeappointedorchosenwithinthirty-fourdaysnextprecedingthefirstWednesdayintheensuingDecember，unlessthereshallnotbetwomonthsbetweenthedateofthenotificationandthefirstWednesdayintheensuingDecember，inwhichcasetheelectionshallbepostponedtilltheensuingyear。ButifthetermoftheofficeofthepresidentandvicepresidentwouldhaveexpiredonthethirdofMarchnextfollowingsuchvacancies，noextraelectionisnecessary，astheregularelectionwillthentakeplaceonthesamedaywhichthesecretaryofstateisotherwisedirectedtonotify。
FortheofficeofbothpresidentandvicepresidentisfixedtocommenceonthefourthofMarchineachyear，andtheregularelectiontakesplaceonthefirstWednesdayoftheprecedingDecember。
Underthesemultipliedprovisions，noinconveniencecanbeapprehended。
Itcanscarcelyeverhappenthatthereshallbeatoneandthesametimenopresident，vicepresident，protemporepresidentofthesenate，andspeakerofthehouseofrepresentatives。
Itmusthoweverbeacknowledgedthatinnorespecthavetheenlargedandprofoundviewsofthosewhoframedtheconstitution，northeexpectationsofthepublicwhentheyadoptedit，beensocompletelyfrustratedasinthepracticaloperationofthesystemsofarasrelatestotheindependenceoftheelectors。
Itwassupposedthattheelectionofthesetwohighofficerswouldbecommittedtomennotlikelytobeswayedbypartyorpersonalbias，whowouldactundernocombinationwithothers，andbesubjectneithertointimidationorcorruption。Itwasassertedthatthechoiceofseveralpersonstoformanintermediatebodyofelectors，wouldbemuchlessapttoconvulsethecommunitywithextraordinarymovements，thanthechoiceofonewhowashimselftobethefinalobjectoftheirwishes。2
Whetherfermentsandcommotionswouldaccompanyageneralelectionbythewholebodyofthepeople，andwhethersuchamodeofelectioncouldbeconvenientlypractisedinreferencetotheratioofrepresentativesprescribedintheconstitution，isyettobeascertained；butexperiencehasfullyconvincedus，thattheelectorsdonotassembleintheirseveralstatesforafreeexerciseoftheirownjudgments，butforthepurposeofelectingtheparticularcandidatewhohappenstobepreferredbythepredominantpoliticalpartywhichhaschosenthoseelectors。Insomeinstancestheprinciplesonwhichtheyarechosenaresofarforgotten，thatelectorspubliclypledgethemselvestovoteforaparticularindividual，andthusthewholefoundationofthiselaboratesystemisdestroyed。
Anotherinnovationhasalsobeenintroduced。Membersofcongress，entrustedonlywiththepowerofordinarylegislation，havefrequentlyformedthemselvesintoaregularbodyattheseatofgovernment，andundertakentopointouttothepeoplecertainpersonsasproperobjectsoftheirchoice。Althoughthemildandplausiblegarbofrecommendationisaloneassumed，yetitseffectisknownandfelttohavebeenoftengreatandsometimesirresistible。
