andthepowerthuswithheldfromitbytheConstitutioncannotbegiventoitbythelegislature。Whenaninstrumentorganizingajudicialsystem；
dividesitintoonesupremeandsomanyinferiorcourtsasthelegislaturemayordainandestablish；thenenumeratesitspowers，andproceedssofartodistributethemastodefinethejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt，bydeclaringthecasesinwhichitshallhaveoriginaljurisdiction，andthoseinwhichitshallhaveappellatejurisdiction，itfollows，thatinoneclassitsjurisdictionisoriginalandnotappellate，andthatintheotheritisappellateandnotoriginal。9
Ithasalreadybeenobserved，thatitdoesnotrestwithcongresstogiveabindingconstructiontotheConstitution。ItcanneitherdiminishnorenlargethepowersoftheSupremeCourt。
Bytheactofthe24thofSeptember，1789，congressundertooktovestintheSupremeCourt，thepowertoissuewritsofmandamus，incaseswarrantedbytheusagesandprinciplesoflaw，toanycourtsappointedby，orpersonsholdingofficeunder，theauthorityoftheUnitedStates。
Inacasewhichdidnotcomewithinthedescriptionoforiginaljurisdiction，containedintheConstitution，amandamuswasmovedforinthesupremecourt，tobedirectedtoapersonholdinganofficeundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，andthereforethecasewaswithintheletterandspiritoftheactofcongress；buttheactwas，inthisrespect，clearlyheldtobeunconstitutionalandvoid，andthemandamuswasrefused。10Thesameactprovides，thatthesupremecourtshallhavepowertoissuewritsofhabeascorpus，wherepersonsareincustody，underorbycolouroftheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，orarecommittedfortrialbeforesomecourtofthesame。Awritofhabeascorpuswasmovedfor，inacasewheretheprisonerwascommittedbythecircuitcourtoftheDistrictofColumbia，onachargeoftreasonagainsttheUnitedStates。ThewritwasgrantedbecauseitamountedonlytoarevisionofthedecisionofaninferiorcourtoftheUnitedStates，11andthereforewasofanappellatenature。
1。Bytheactof24thSept。1789。
2。ActofApril30，1790。
3。ActofSept。24，1789。
4。CaseofDuPlaine，consulatBoston，in1793。
5。3Dallas，6。
6。Vattel，I。2。?34。
7。Theeleventhamendmentisinthesewords:\"ThejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallnotbeconstruedtoextendtoanysuitinlaworequitycommencedorprosecutedagainstoneoftheUnitedStatesbycitizensofanotherstate，orbycitizensorsubjectsofanyforeignstate。\"
8。6Wheaton，p。399。
9。1Cranch，175，Marburyv。Madison。
10。Ibid。
11。ExparteBollman，4Cranch，75。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXVCHAPTERXXV。OFTRIBUNALSINFERIORTOTHESUPREMECOURT。INrespecttoalltheothersubjectsofthejudicialpower，theoriginaljurisdictionisvestedintheinferiortribunalsordainedandestablishedbycongress，whichconsistofcircuitcourts，districtcourts，andterritorialcourts。TheseareallcourtsoftheUnitedStates?thejudgesareappointedbythepresident?theirpowerislimitedtothepowerwhichispossessedundertheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates?andthedecisionsofthemallmaybeultimatelyreviewed，reversed，oraffirmedinthesupremecourt。Butcongresshasundertaken，insomeinstances，tovestinstatecourtsapowerofproceedingforoffencescommittedagainsttheUnitedStates，whichhasproducedaquestionofconsiderablemagnitude，notyetdefinitivelysettled。Someofthestatecourtshaverefusedtoexercisethisjurisdiction，andthereseemsmuchweightintheirobjections。
TheprincipleonwhichthejudicialpoweroftheConstitutionisfounded，hasalreadybeenobservedtobe，itsforminganintegralpartofthesystemofgovernment。ItwasdeemedasnecessarytokeepthejudicialpowersofthestatesandtheUnitedStatesseparateanddistinct，asthelegislativeandexecutivepowers。
ToadmitthestatecourtstoashareofthejudicialpowersoftheUnitedStatesincriminalcases，wouldtend，itwassupposed，notonlytobreakdownthosebarrierswhichweredeemedimportanttotheself-preservationoftheUnitedStates，butwouldproduceperplexityandconfusion，dangeroustotheharmonyofboth。
TheofficeofcongressistoappointthosecourtswhicharetoreceivethepowersvestedintheUnitedStates，nottograntthosepowerstothecourts。Congressarenotthedonors，butthemereagentsofdistribution。
Impressionssometimesarise，andconsequencesoftenflowfromthelattercapacity，whichdonotregularlyattendtheformer。Thegratificationofmakingdonationscannotbeenjoyedbythosewhoareonlytheagentstodistribute，andwhennotonlythatwhichistobedistributedispreciselydefinedandlimited，butthosewhoareexclusivelytoreceiveitareexactlydescribed，thereseemssolittlelatitudeinthepowerastoexcitesomesurprisethatitshouldhavebeencarriedsofar。Butthemotivesforitwereofthebestkind。Itwasdeemedaconveniencetoindividualstogivethemaforumasneartotheirresidenceaspossible:itwasalsoperhapsconsideredindicativeofaconfidenceinthestategovernments，andiftheConstitutionhadbeenaccommodatedtotheseprinciples，thisdonationofpowermighthavebeenjustifiable，butunlessthevestingjurisdictioninatribunalalreadyordainedandestablishedbyastate，canbeconsideredasordainingandestablishingacourtbycongress，theobjectionstothiswellmeantmeasureseeminsurmountable。
Thisisnot，however，tobeconfoundedwiththelegalprinciplesthatarisewhenanactamountstoanoffencebothagainstthestateandtheUnitedStates。Ascongresscannotinonecaseconferjurisdiction，theycannotintheotherabridgeit；hencethoseactsofcongressprovidingforthepunishmentofcounterfeitingthecurrentcoinoftheUnitedStates，1andforgeryofthenotesofthebankoftheUnitedStates，2whichdeclaredthatnothingthereincontainedshouldbeconstruedtodeprivethestatecourtsofjurisdictionunderthelawsoftheseveralstatesofoffencesmadecognizabletherein，werestrictlyconstitutionalandproper。
Innocasecanthecircuitordistrictcourtsexercisejurisdiction，unlessitbesoprovidedbycongress。ThejudicialpartoftheConstitution，exceptsofarasrelatestothesupremecourt，mustbesetinmotionbycongress。Itis，therefore，propertoshowtowhatextentthepowerhasbeenexercisedbycongress，observingatthesametimethatnothingpreventsthemfromextendingthejurisdictionofthoseorothercourtswhichtheymayhereafterordainandestablish，providedtheydonotexceedthelimitsoftheConstitution。
TheoriginaljurisdictionofthecircuitcourtnowextendstosuitsinwhichtheUnitedStatesareplaintiff；orpetitioners，tosuitsbetweencitizensofdifferentstatesandthoseinwhichanalienisaparty，tosuitsrelativetopatentsgrantedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，andtosuitsbroughtbyoragainsttheBankoftheUnitedStates。
IncriminalcasesthecircuitcourthasoriginaljurisdictionofallcrimesandoffencescognizableundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，except，aswehaveseen，proceedingsagainstambassadorsandotherpublicministersortheirdomestics，which，wheneveracourtoflawcanexerciseajurisdictionconsistentlywiththelawofnations，arereservedforthesupremecourt。
Theoriginaljurisdictionofthedistrictcourtincivilcasesincludesallcausesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction；seizuresunderlawsofimpost，navigationortradeoftheUnitedStates，madeonwatersnavigablefromtheseabyvesselsoftenormoretonsburthen，withintheirrespectivedistrictsoronthehighseas；seizuresonland，orotherwatersthanaforesaid；
penaltiesandforfeitures；suitsbroughtbyanalienforatortonlyinviolationofthelawsofnations，oratreatyoftheUnitedStates；suitsatcommonlawwheretheUnitedStatessue，andthematterindisputeamounts，exclusiveofcosts，toonehundreddollars；suitsagainstconsulsorviceconsuls。
Incriminalcases，cognizanceisgiventothedistrictcourtsofallcrimesandoffencescognizableundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，committedwithintheirrespectivedistricts，oronthehighseas，whenwhippingnotexceedingthirtystripes，afinenotexceedingonehundreddollars，oratermofimprisonmentnotexceedingsixmonthsistobeinflicted，3andwiththisqualificationitmaysustainprosecutionsagainstconsulsorviceconsuls。
Inrespecttothelatter，itdeservesnotice，thatthislegislativeprovisionsubjectingthemincertainsupposedcasestothejurisdictionofthelowestcourtintheUnion，issomewhatatvariancewiththehighrankthattheyareplacedinbytheConstitution。Itcannot，however，besaidtobeinconsistentwiththeConstitutionitself，whichinrespecttoallthejurisdictionofthesupremecourtcontainsnothingexclusiveoftheinferiorcourtsoftheUnitedStates，yettheentireomissionofthisclause，which，qualifiedasitis，isreallyinoperative，wouldhavebetterharmonizedwiththeprinciplesmanifestlykeptinviewbytheConstitution。
1。ActofApril21，1806。
2。ActsofFebruary24，1807，andApril10，1816。
3。Thispartofthecriminaljurisdictionofthedistrictcourtisasyetadeadletter。ThereisnocrimeoroffenceagainsttheUnitedStates，forwhichapunishmentwithinthelimitsabovementionedisprescribed。Itcannotbeunderstoodthatprosecutionsforoffencespunishablebytheactsofcongressinamoreseveremanner，canbesustainedwithaviewtothejudgmentofthecourtbeingreducedwithintheselimits。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXVICHAPTERXXVI。REMOVALFROMSTATECOURTS。OTHERpartsofthejudicialpowerarebyactsofcongressprovidedforasfollows:?
Ifasuitbecommencedinastatecourtagainstanalien，orbyacitizenofthestateinwhichasuitisbroughtagainstacitizenofanotherstate；
thedefendantmayhavethebenefitoftheunbiassedjudicaturesoftheUnitedStates，byremovingthesuitintothecircuitcourtofthesamedistrict，provideditbedoneimmediately，forthecomplainantoughtnottosufferbythehesitationordelayofhisopponent?butifthealienorcitizenofanotherstatehascommencedthesuit，hecannotafterwardsremoveit，forheisboundbyhisownelection，norcanthedefendantremoveit，forheisnottobeapprehensiveoftheinjusticeofthecourtsofhisownstate。
Ifthereisacontroversyinastatecourtrespectingthetitletolandbetweentwocitizensofthesamestate，andeitherpartyshallmakeitappeartothecourt，thatheclaimsandshallrelyuponarightunderagrantfromastateotherthanthatinwhichthesuitispending，andtheotherpartyclaimsunderagrantfromthelastmentionedstate，thepartyclaimingunderthegrantfirstmentioned，whetherplaintiffordefendant，mayremovethesuittothecircuitcourtforthesamedistrict，butneitherpartysoremovingthecause，shallbeallowedtopleadorgiveevidenceonthetrialinthecircuitcourtofanyothertitlethanthatbyhimsostatedasthegroundofhisclaim。Thisisperfectlyconsistentwiththeprinciple，thatinallcontroversiesthemostimpartialtribunalthatcanbeformed，shallbeselected，andtheproprietyofadoptingthissomewhatcircuitousmode，insteadofenablingtheclaimantunderthegrantofanotherstatetobringhisactionatonceintheUnitedStatescourt，arisesfromthejuridicalrulethatthedefendant，unlesssomeexpressprovisionismadetocompelhim，shallnotatlawbeobligedtoshowonwhattitleherelies，beforethecommencementofthetrial。Acitizenofanotherstateoranalien，(inthosecaseswhereanalienmayholdland，)isnotobligednorindeedallowedtoadoptthiscourse，becausehemaycommenceasuitintheUnitedStatescourtsorremoveitthere，asnoticedbefore，immediatelyonits，beingcommencedagainsthim，anditishisownfollynottoavailhimselfofthisbenefitinthefirstinstance。
NoothercourtoftheUnitedStatesthanthesupremecourtcanentertainasuitbroughtbyastate，eitheragainstanotherstateoragainstindividuals。
Inthisrespect，congresshasnofurtherlegislatedthantodeclarethatthejurisdictionofthesupremecourtshallbeexclusive，exceptbetweenastateanditscitizens。ThisinferencewouldindeedflowfromthewordsoftheConstitution，whichcouldneverbesoconstruedastopreventastatefromsuingitsowncitizens，orthoseofotherstatesoraliens，initsowncourts。Inregardtosuitsagainststates，theywereunknownbeforetheConstitution，andsincetheamendmentalreadyadvertedto，theonlyremainingclassisabovethejurisdictionofthecircuitcourts。
Jurisdictionbywayofappealorwritoferror，accordingtothenatureofthecase，isgiventothecircuitfromthedistrictcourt，andtothesupremefromthecircuitcourt。Butapecuniaryqualificationisannexedbothtotheoriginalandappellatejurisdictioninmostcases。ThedistrictcourthascognizanceofallcivilsuitsbroughtbytheUnitedStateswherethematterindispute，exclusiveofcosts，amountstoonehundreddollars。
Theoriginaljurisdictionofthecircuitcourtisdescribedasapplyingtocaseswherethematterindispute，exclusiveofcosts，exceedsfivehundreddollars。Yetitwouldseem，thatifanysumexceedingthreehundreddollarswasfounddue，thecourtcouldsustainthejurisdiction，althoughtheplaintiffwouldbeliabletocosts。Tosustainthejurisdictiononasuitfortheviolationofapatentright，anysum，howeversmall，thatmayberecovered，issufficient。
TosustainthejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtonwritsoferror，thematterindispute，exclusiveofcosts，mustexceedtwothousanddollars。
Thereisperhapstoomuchdisproportioninthesesums，andthereseemslittlereasonforexcludingastrangeroracitizenofanotherstatefromthebenefitofarevisionofthejudgment，foranysumbelowfivehundreddollars。NopecuniarylimitisadvertedtointheConstitution，andalthoughthereisweightinthesuggestionthatthedignityofacourtisimpairedbygivinganeartotriflingcontroversies，yetthehumblestsuitorisentitledinsomeshapetorelief；andtheprincipleonwhichtheclassificationofthesubjectsofjudicialcognizanceisfounded，oughtnottobeimpairedbyastandardofvalue，whichtoapoormanmayamounttoadenialofjustice。
Inthischapter，thereis(asoccasionallyelsewhere)adeviationfromtheoriginalplanofconfiningourselvestoanexpositionoftheConstitution。
Thelegislativedevelopementofprinciples，brieflyexpressedinthegreattext，whenitcorrectlyexplainsandappliesthoseprinciples，ishighlyuseful。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXVIICHAPTERXXVII。OFTHEPLACESINWHICHTHEJURISDICTIONISTOBEEXERCISED。HAVINGthusshownthesubjectstowhichthisjurisdictionextends，andthecourtsamongwhichitisdistributed，weshallproceedtoconsidertheplacesinwhichitistobeexercised，andtherulesandprinciplesbywhichitistobeadministered。
ThegeographicallimitsoftheUnitedStatesandthoseoftheterritories，aresubjecttothejurisdictionofallthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，inallmatterswithinthescopeoftheirauthority。
Forthebetteradministrationofjustice，theUnitedStatesaredividedintodistricts，informingwhich，theconvenienceofsuitorsischieflyconsulted。Ithaseverbeenaprinciplewithus，tobringjusticeasmuchaspossiblehometothedoorsofthepeople。Thesedistrictsmaybealteredatthepleasureofcongress。Thejurisdictionoftheparticularcourtsisofcourseconfidedtothem。Butsomecourtspossessingonlyaspecialjurisdictionastothesubject，arewithoutrestrictionastotheplace。Suchisthesenateinrespecttoimpeachments，bothhouseswhenactingjudiciallyinrespecttocontemptsandbreachesofprivileges，andcourtsmartial。
Theextentoftheadmiraltyjurisdictionatsea，hasalreadybeennoticed。
Inthesethesubjectsarelimited，butageneraljurisdictionappertainstotheUnitedStatesovercededterritoriesordistricts。
Iftheland，atthetimeofcession，isuninhabited，exceptbytheIndians，ofwhosepolitywetakenoaccount，itisinthepowerofcongresstomakesuchregulationsforitsgovernmentastheymaythinkproper。Whoeversubsequentlybecomesaninhabitant，isofcourseboundtoconformtothesystemwhichmaybethusestablished；iftherebeanumberofcivilizedinhabitantspreviouslysettledthere，enjoyingtheadvantagesofaparticularcodeoflaws，theyhaveajustrighttoclaimacontinuanceofthoselaws。Thusinthefirstcessionofthiskind，whichwasfromthestatesofMassachusetts，Connecticut，NewYork，andVirginia，andformedwhatwastermedtheterritoryNorth-westoftheOhio，therewasasavingtotheFrenchandCanadianinhabitants，andothersettlersoftheKaskaskias，St。Vincents，andtheneighbouringvillages，whohadtheretoforeprofessedthemselvescitizensofVirginia，ofthelawsandcustomstheninforceamongthemrelativetothedescentandconveyanceofproperty，andinthetreatybywhichLouisianawascededtotheUnitedStatesin1803，itwasexpresslystipulatedthattheinhabitantsshouldretaintheirancientlawsandusages。
Withtheserestrictions，congresshasalwaysbeenconsideredasentitlednotonlytoregulatetheformofgovernment，butalsotoreservetothemselvestheapprobationorrejectionofsuchlaws，asmaybepassedbythelegislativepowerwhichtheymayestablish。Inregulatingthegovernmentoftheterritorynorth-westoftheOhio，whichwastheactofcongressundertheconfederation，andwhichhasbeenthemodelofmostofthesubsequentregulationsofthesamenature，itisdeclaredthatthegovernorandjudgeswho，untilthepopulationamountedtofivethousandmaleinhabitants，weretocomposetheirlegislature，shouldadoptsuchlawsoftheoriginalstatesasmightbenecessaryandsuitabletotheircircumstances，which，unlessdisapprovedbycongress，shouldbeinforceuntiltheorganizationofageneralassembly，whichwastotakeplacewhenthepopulationreachedthenumberbeforementioned。
TheselawsmaythereforebeconsideredasemanatingfromtheUnitedStates，andthejudicialauthorityistoberegardedasthejudicialauthorityoftheUnitedStates。
InrespecttothoseportionsoflandwhichbecomethepropertyoftheUnitedStatesforthepurposesofarsenals，dockyards，&；c。itmaybeobserved，thatexclusivelegislationgenerallyimpliesexclusivejurisdiction。
Yetthepeculiarnatureofthispossessionmayrequiresomequalification，and，therefore，areservationbyastateofthepowertoserveitscivilandcriminalprocessthereinbyitsownofficers，isnotobjectionable。
Itpreventstheparticularspotfrombecomingasanctuaryforcriminalsordebtors，andfromtheassentoftheUnitedStatesitresults，thatthestateofficers，inexecutingsuchprocess，actundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates。1Indeed，ageneralprovisiontothiseffecthasbeenmadebyanactofcongress，2althoughnoreservationbemadebythestate。
Thepowerofexercisingexclusivelegislationoversuchdistrictsasshouldbecometheseatofgovernment，likeallotherswhicharespecified，isconferredoncongress，notasamerelocallegislature，butasthelegislatureoftheUnion，andcannotbeexercisedinanyothercharacter。Alawpassedinpursuanceofitisthesupremelawoftheland；isbindingassuchonthestates，andalawofastatetodefeatitwouldbevoid。Thepowertopasssuchalaw，carrieswithitallthoseincidentalpowerswhicharenecessarytoitscompleteandeffectualexecution；andsuchlawmay，itseems，beextendedinitscollateraloperationthroughouttheUnitedStates，ifcongressthinkitnecessarytodoso。Butifitbeintendedtogiveitabindingefficacybeyondthedistrict，languageshowingthisintentionoughttobeused，especiallyifitistoextendintotheparticularstates，andtolimitandcontroltheirpenallaws。3
Soalsothepowervestedincongresstolegislateexclusivelywithinanyotherplacecededbyastate，carrieswithitarighttomakethatpowereffectual。Theymaythereforeprovidebylawforapprehendingapersonwhoescapesfromafort，&；c。aftercommittingafelony，andforconveyinghimtoorfromanyotherplacefortrialorexecution。Sotheymaypunishthoseformisprisionoffelony，who，outofafortconcealafelonycommittedwithinit。4
Whereafortresswithintheacknowledgedlimitsofastate，wassurrenderedunderthetreatyof1794withGreatBritain，andwasafterwardsconstantlypossessedandgarrisonedbytheUnitedStates，butwasneverpurchasedfromthestatebytheUnitedStates，orcededtothelatterbytheformer，theUnitedStatesdonotpossesstherightofexclusivelegislationorexclusivejurisdictionoversuchfortress，butcrimescommittedthereinmaybepunishedunderthelawsandbythecourtsofthestate。TogivetheUnitedStatesexclusivelegislationandjurisdictionoveraplace，theremustbeafreecessionofthesame，foroneofthepurposesspecifiedintheConstitution。Theycannotacquireittortiouslyorbydisseisinofthestate，orbyoccupancywithmerelythetacitconsentofthestate，whensuchoccupancyisasamilitarypost，thoughobtainedafteratreatybywhichforeigngarrisonswerewithdrawnfromourposts。Andtheruleisthesame，althoughthetitletosuchplacebevestedintheUnitedStates，bypurchasesfromindividuals，andithasbeenoccupiedbythemasamilitarypost；foriftherehasbeennocessionbythelegislatureofthestatetotheUnitedStates，therightoflegislationandjurisdictionoversuchplace，remainsexclusivelyinthestatewhereitissituated。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXVIIICHAPTERXXVIII。OFTHEAPPELLATEJURISDICTION。THEgeneralexpressionsoftheConstitutionare，thatthesupremecourtshallhaveappellatejurisdictioninallcasesoflawandequity，bothastolawandfact，withsuchexceptionsandundersuchregulationsascongressshallmake，ofallcontroversiestowhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty；controversiesbetweentwoormorestates；betweenastateandcitizensofanotherstate；betweencitizensofdeferentstates；betweencitizensofthesamestateclaiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentstates，andbetweenastateorthecitizensthereofandforeignstates，citizensorsubjects。
Thepowergiventoexceptandtoregulatedoesnot?exvitermini-carrywithitapowertoenlargethejurisdiction；sofarthereforeasitrelatestothesubjectsofjurisdiction，wemustconsideritasconfinedbytheenumerationofthem。
ButonanotherquestiontheConstitutionisnotequallyexplicit。Itisnotsaidwhethertherevisionofthesentencesofothercourtsextendstostatecourts，orislimitedtothecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Somediscussionstookplaceonthissubjectinthestateconventions，andthequestionwasnotperhapsentirelyatresttilltheyear1821，whenitagainaroseinthesupremecourt，receiveditscloseattention，anditispresumed，itsfinaldecision。
Theclearandconvincingelucidationsofthechiefjusticewouldsufferbyabridgement，andcouldnotbeimprovedbythesubstitutionofotherlanguage。
HeobservesthattheUnitedStatesformanyandmostimportantpurposesformasinglenation。
\"Inmakingpeace，weareonepeople。Inallcommercialregulations，weareoneandthesamepeople。Inmanyotherrespects，theAmericanpeopleareone，andthegovernmentwhichisalonecapableofcontrollingandmanagingtheirinterestinalltheserespects，isthegovernmentoftheUnion，andinthatcharacterthepeoplehavenoother。Americahaschosentobeinmanyrespectsandtomanypurposesanation；andforallthesepurposes，hergovernmentiscompetentandcomplete。Thepeoplehavedeclared，thatintheexerciseofallpowersgivenfortheseobjects，itissupreme。Itcan，then，inaffectingtheseobjects，legitimatelycontrolallindividualsorgovernmentswithintheAmericanterritory。Theconstitutionandlawsofastate，sofarastheyarerepugnanttotheConstitutionandtheconstitutionallawsoftheUnitedStates，areabsolutelyvoid。ThesestatesareconstituentpartsoftheUnitedStates。Theyaremembersofonegreatempire?forsomepurposessovereign；forsomepurposessubordinate。
\"Inagovernmentsoconstituted，isitunreasonablethatthejudicialpowershouldbecompetenttogiveefficacytotheconstitutionallawsofthelegislature?ThatdepartmentcandecideonthevalidityoftheconstitutionorlawofastateifitberepugnanttotheConstitutionortoalawoftheUnitedStates。Isitunreasonablethatitshouldalsobeempoweredtodecideonthejudgmentofastatetribunalenforcingsuchunconstitutionallaw?Isitsoveryunreasonableastofurnishajustificationforcontrollingthewordsofaconstitution?
\"Whenagovernmentisconfessedlysupreme，inrespecttoobjectsofvitalinteresttothenation，thereisnothinginconsistentwithsoundreason，orincompatiblewiththenatureofgovernment，inmakingallitsdepartmentssupreme，sofarasrespectsthoseobjects，andsofarasisnecessaryintheirattainment。TheexerciseoftheappellatepoweroverthosejudgmentsofthestatetribunalswhichmaycontravenetheConstitutionorlawsoftheUnitedStates，isessentialtotheattainmentofthoseobjects。
\"TheproprietyofentrustingtheconstructionoftheConstitution，andlawsmadeinpursuancethereof，tothejudiciaryoftheUnion，hasnot，asyet，beendrawnintoquestion。Itseemstobeacorollaryfromthispoliticalaxiom，thatthefederalcourtsshouldeitherpossessexclusivejurisdictioninsuchcases，orapowertorevisethejudgmentrenderedinthembythestatetribunals。Ifthefederalandstatecourtshaveconcurrentjurisdictioninallcasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates；andifacaseofthisdescription，broughtinastatecourt，cannotberemovedbeforejudgment，norrevisedafterjudgment，thentheconstructionoftheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates，isnotconfidedparticularlytotheirjudicialdepartment，butisconfidedequallytothatdepartment，andtothestatecourts，howevertheymaybeconstituted。\'Thirteenindependentcourts，\'saysaverycelebratedstatesman，(andwehavenowmorethantwentysuchcourts，)\'offinaljurisdictionoverthesamecauses，arisinguponthesamelaws，isahydraingovernment，fromwhichnothingbutcontradictionandconfusioncanproceed。\'
\"Dismissingtheunpleasantsuggestion，thatanymotiveswhichmaynotbefairlyavowed，orwhichoughtnottoexist，caneverinfluenceastateoritscourts；thenecessityofuniformity，aswellascorrectnessinexpoundingtheConstitutionandlawsoftheUnitedStates，woulditselfsuggesttheproprietyofvestinginsomesingletribunal，thepowerofdecidinginthelastresort，allcasesinwhichtheyareinvolved。
\"Wearenotrestrained，then，bythepoliticalrelationsbetweenthegeneralandstategovernments，fromconstruingthewordsoftheConstitution，definingthejudicialpower，intheirtruesense。Wearenotboundtoconstruethemmorerestrictivelythantheynaturallyimport。
\"TheygivetotheSupremeCourtappellatejurisdiction，inallcasesarisingundertheConstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates。
Thewordsarebroadenoughtocomprehendallcasesofthisdescription，inwhatevercourttheymaybedecided。Inexpoundingthem，wemaybepermittedtotakeintoview，thoseconsiderationstowhichcourtshavealwaysallowedgreatweightintheexpositionoflaws。
\"TheframersoftheConstitutionwouldnaturallyexaminethestateofthingsexistingatthetime；andtheirworksufficientlyatteststhattheydidso。Allacknowledgethattheywereconvenedforthepurposeofstrengtheningtheconfederationbyenlargingthepowersofthegovernment，andbygivingefficacytothosewhichitbeforepossessed，butcouldnotexercise。Theyinformusthemselves，intheinstrumenttheypresentedtotheAmericanpublic，thatoneofitsobjectswastoformamoreperfectunion。Undersuchcircumstances，wecertainlyshouldnotexpecttofind，inthatinstrument，adiminutionofthepowersoftheactualgovernment。
\"Previoustotheadoptionoftheconfederation，congressestablishedcourtswhichreceivedappealsinprizecausesdecidedinthecourtsoftherespectivestates。Thispowerofthegovernment，toestablishtribunalsfortheseappeals，wasthoughtconsistentwith，andwasfoundedon，itspoliticalrelationswiththestates。Thesecourtsexercisedappellatejurisdictionoverthosecasesdecidedinthestatecourts，towhichthejudicialpowerofthefederalgovernmentextended。
\"Theconfederationgavetocongressthepowerof\'establishingcourtsforreceivinganddeterminingfinallyappealsinallcasesofcaptures。\'
\"Thispowerwasuniformlyconstruedtoauthorizethosecourtstoreceiveappealsfromthesentencesofstatecourts，andtoaffirmorreversethem。
Statetribunalsarenotmentioned；butthisclauseintheconfederationnecessarilycomprisesthem。Yettherelationbetweenthegeneralandstategovernmentswasmuchweakerandmuchmorelax，undertheconfederationthanunderthepresentConstitution；andthestatesbeingmuchmorecompletelysovereign，theirinstitutionsweremuchmoreindependent。
\"TheconventionwhichframedtheConstitution，onturningtheirattentiontothejudicialpower，founditlimitedtoafewobjects，butwithrespecttosomeofthoseobjectsextendinginitsappellateformtothejudgmentsofthestatecourts。Theyextendedit，amongotherobjects，toallcasesarisingundertheConstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates；
andinasubsequentclausedeclare，that，insuchcases，thesupremecourtshallexerciseappellatejurisdiction。NothingseemstobegivenwhichwouldjustifythewithdrawalofajudgmentrenderedinastatecourtontheConstitution，laws，ortreatiesoftheUnitedStatesfromthisappellatejurisdiction。
\"Greatweighthasalwaysbeenattachedtocontemporaneousexposition。
Noquestion，itisbelieved，hasarisentowhichthisprincipleappliesmoreunequivocallythantothatnowunderconsideration。
\"Indiscussingtheextentofthejudicialpower，theFederalistsays，\'Hereanotherquestionoccurs:whatrelationwouldsubsistbetweenthenationalandstatecourtsintheseinstancesofconcurrentjurisdiction?
Ianswer，thatanappealwouldcertainlybefromthelattertothesupremecourtoftheUnitedStates。TheConstitutionindirecttermsgivesanappellatejurisdictiontothesupremecourtinalltheenumeratedcasesoffederalcognizanceinwhichitisnottohaveanoriginalone，withoutasingleexpressiontoconfineitsoperationtotheinferiorfederalcourts。Theobjectsofappeal，notthetribunalsfromwhichitistobemade，arealonecontemplated。Fromthiscircumstance，andfromthereasonofthething，itoughttobeconstruedtoextendtothestatetribunals。Eitherthismustbethecase，orthelocalcourtsmustbeexcludedfromaconcurrentjurisdictioninmattersofnationalconcern，elsethejudicialauthorityoftheUnionmaybeeludedatthepleasureofeveryplaintifforprosecutor。
Neitheroftheseconsequencesought，withoutevidentnecessity，tobeinvolved；
thelatterwouldbeentirelyinadmissible，asitwoulddefeatsomeofthemostimportantandavowedpurposesoftheproposedgovernment，andwouldessentiallyembarrassitsmeasures。NordoIperceiveanyfoundationforsuchasupposition。Agreeablytotheremarkalreadymade，thenationalandstatesystemsaretoberegardedasonewhole。ThecourtsofthelatterwillofcoursebenaturalauxiliariestotheexecutionofthelawsoftheUnion，andanappealfromthemwillasnaturallybetothattribunalwhichisdestinedtouniteandassimilatetheprinciplesofnaturaljustice，andtherulesofnationaldecision。Theevidentaimoftheplanofthenationalconventionis，thatallthecausesofthespecifiedclassesshall，forweightypublicreasons，receivetheiroriginalorfinaldeterminationinthecourtsoftheUnion。Toconfine，therefore，thegeneralexpressionswhichgiveappellatejurisdictiontothesupremecourt，toappealsfromthesubordinatefederalcourts，insteadofallowingtheirextensiontothestatecourts，wouldbetoabridgethelatitudeofthetermsinsubversionoftheintent，contrarytoeverysoundruleofinterpretation。\'
\"AcontemporaneousexpositionoftheConstitution，certainlyofnotlessauthoritythanthatwhichhasbeenjustcited，isthejudiciaryactitself。Weknowthatinthecongresswhichpassedthatact，weremanyeminentmembersoftheconventionwhichformedtheConstitution。Notasingleindividualsofarasisknown，supposedthatpartoftheactwhichgivesthesupremecourtappellatejurisdictionoverthejudgmentsofthestatecourtsinthecasesthereinspecified，tobeunauthorizedbytheConstitution。
\"Whileonthispartoftheargument，itmaybealsomaterialtoobserve，thattheuniformdecisionsofthiscourtonthepointnowunderconsideration，havebeenassentedto，withasingleexception，1bythecourtsofeverystateintheUnion，whosejudgmentshavebeenrevised。
Ithasbeentheunwelcomedutyofthistribunaltoreversethejudgmentsofmanystatecourtsincasesinwhichthestrongeststatefeelingswereengaged。Judges，whosetalentsandcharacterwouldgraceanybench；towhomadispositiontosubmittojurisdictionthatisusurped，ortosurrendertheirlegitimatepowers，willcertainlynotbeimputed，haveyieldedwithouthesitationtotheauthoritybywhichtheirjudgmentswerereversed，whiletheyperhapsdisapprovedthejudgmentofreversal。
\"Thisconcurrenceofstatesmen，oflegislators，andofjudges，inthesameconstructionoftheConstitution，mayjustlyinspiresomeconfidenceinthatconstructions。\"2
Inthiscase，asmayhavebeenperceivedfromthecourseofreasoning，theappellatejurisdictionwasexercisedoverastatecourt。In1824，theconsiderationofthesamequestionwasagainthrownonthesupremecourt，onanappealfromthecircuitcourtoftheUnitedStatesforthedistrictofOhio，inanequitycase。
Intheextractweshallalsogiveofthedecisionpronouncedbythechiefjusticeinthiscase，weshallperceivesomefurtherimportantprincipleslaiddownwhichwillbefoundserviceableinafutureviewofthepowersoftheUnitedStatescourtsthatwillbepresentedtothereader；atthesametimewemustnotbeunderstoodtohaveadesigntoapplyarguments，evidentlyintendedonlyforcasesofacivilnature，furtherthanfairreasoningwilljustify。
\"Insupportoftheclause，intheactincorporatingthesubscriberstotheBankoftheUnitedStates，itissaidthatthelegislative，executive，andjudicialpowers，ofeverywellconstructedgovernment，areco-extensivewitheachother。Thatis，theyarepotentiallyco-extensive。Theexecutivedepartmentmayconstitutionallyexecuteeverylawwhichthelegislaturemayconstitutionallymake，andthejudicialdepartmentmayreceivefromthelegislaturethepowerofconstruingeverysuchlaw。Allgovernmentswhicharenotextremelydefectiveintheirorganization，mustpossesswithinthemselvesthemeansofexpoundingaswellasenforcingtheirownlaws。
IfweexaminetheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，wefindthatitsframerskeptthispoliticalprincipleinview。Thesecondarticleveststhewholeexecutivepowerinthepresident，andthethirddeclares，that\'thejudicialpowershallextendtoallcasesinlawandequityarisingunderthisConstitution，thelawsoftheUnitedStates，andtreatiesmade，orwhichshallbemadeundertheirauthority。\'
\"ThisclauseenablesthejudicialdepartmenttoreceivejurisdictiontothefullextentoftheConstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates，whenanyquestionrespectingthemshallassumesuchaformthatthejudicialpoweriscapableofactingonit。Thatpoweriscapableofactingonlywhenthesubjectissubmittedtoitbyapartywhoassertshisrightsintheformprescribedbylaw。Itthenbecomes\'acase，\'andtheConstitutiondeclaresthatthejudicialpowershallextendto\'allcasesarisingundertheConstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates。\'
\"ThesuitoftheBankoftheUnitedStatesv。Osborneandothers，is\'acase，\'andthequestionis，whetheritarisesunderalawoftheUnitedStates?
\"Theappellantscontendthatitdoesnot，becauseseveralquestionsmayariseinit，whichdependonthegeneralprinciplesofthelaw，notonanyactofcongress。
\"Ifthisweresufficienttowithdrawacasefromthejurisdictionofthefederalcourts，almosteverycase，althoughinvolvingtheconstructionofalaw，wouldbewithdrawn；andaclauseintheConstitutionrelatingtoasubjectofvitalimportancetothegovernment，andexpressedinthemostcomprehensiveterms，wouldbeconstruedtomeanalmostnothing。Thereisscarcelyanycase，everypartofwhichdependsontheConstitution，laws，ortreatiesoftheUnitedStates。Thequestionswhetherthefactallegedasthefoundationoftheactionberealorfictitious；whethertheconductoftheplaintiffhasbeensuchastoentitlehimtomaintainhisaction；whetherhisrightisbarred；whetherhehasreceivedsatisfaction，orhasinanymannerreleasedhisclaims?arequestions，someorallofwhichmayoccurinalmosteverycase；andiftheirexistencebesufficienttoarrestthejurisdictionofthecourt，wordswhichseemintendedtobeasextensiveastheConstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnion?whichseemdesignedtogivethecourtsofthegovernment，theconstructionofallitsacts，sofarastheyaffecttherightsofindividuals，wouldbereducedtoalmostnothing。
\"InthosecasesinwhichoriginaljurisdictionisgiventotheSupremeCourt，thejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatescannotbeexercisedinitsappellateform。Ineveryothercase，thepoweristobeexercisedinitsoriginalorappellateform，orboth，asthewisdomofcongressmaydirect。
Withtheexceptionofthosecases，inwhichoriginaljurisdictionisgiventothiscourt，thereisnonetowhichthejudicialpowerextends，fromwhichtheoriginaljurisdictionoftheinteriorcourtsisexcludedbytheConstitution。Originaljurisdiction，sofarastheConstitutiongivesarule，isco-extensivewiththejudicialpower。WefindintheConstitution，noprohibitiontoitsexercise，ineverycaseinwhichthejudicialpowercanbeexercised。Itwouldbeaveryboldconstructiontosaythatthispowercouldbeappliedinitsappellateformonly，tothemostimportantclassofcasestowhichitisapplicable。
\"TheConstitutionestablishestheSupremeCourt，anddefinesitsjurisdiction。
Itenumeratescasesinwhichitsjurisdictionisoriginalandexclusive；
andthendefinesthatwhichisappellate，butdoesnotinsinuatethatinanysuchcasethepowercannotbeexercisedinitsoriginalformbycourtsoforiginaljurisdiction。Itisnotinsinuatedthatthejudicialpower，incasesdependingonthecharacterofthecause，cannotbeexercisedinthefirstinstance，inthecourtsoftheUnion，butmustfirstbeexercisedinthetribunalsofthestate；tribunalsoverwhichthegovernmentoftheUnionhasnoadequatecontrol，andwhichmaybeclosedtoanyclaimassertedunderalawoftheUnitedStates。
\"Weperceive，then，nogroundonwhichthepropositioncanbemaintained，thatcongressisincapableofgivingthecircuitcourtsoriginaljurisdictioninanycasetowhichtheappellatejurisdictionextends。
\"Weask，then，ifitcanbesufficienttoexcludethisjurisdiction，thatthecaseinvolvesquestionsdependingongeneralprinciples?Acausemaydependonseveralquestionsoffactandlaw。SomeofthemmaydependontheconstructionofalawoftheUnitedStates；othersonprinciplesunconnectedwiththatlaw。Ifitbeasufficientfoundationforjurisdiction，thatthetitleorrightsetupbytheparty，maybedefeatedbyoneconstructionoftheConstitutionorlawoftheUnitedStates，andsustainedbytheoppositeconstruction，providedthefactsnecessarytosupporttheactionbemadeout；thenalltheotherquestionsmustbedecidedasincidentaltothis，whichgivesthatjurisdiction。Thoseotherquestionscannotarresttheproceedings。Underthisconstruction，thejudicialpoweroftheUnionextendseffectivelyandbeneficiallytothatmostimportantclassofcases，whichdependonthecharacterofthecause。Ontheoppositeconstruction，thejudicialpowernevercanbeextendedtoawholecase，asexpressedbytheConstitution，buttothosepartsofcasesonlywhichpresenttheparticularquestioninvolvingtheconstructionoftheConstitutionorthelaw。Wesay，itnevercanbeextendedtothewholecase，because，ifthecircumstancethatotherpointsareinvolvedinit，shalldisablecongressfromauthorizingthecourtsoftheUniontotakejurisdictionoftheoriginalcause，itequallydisablescongressfromauthorizingthosecourtstotakejurisdictionofthewholecauseonanappeal；andthus，wordswhichintheirplainsenseapplytoawholecause，willberestrictedtoasinglequestioninthatcause；andwordsobviouslyintendedtosecuretothosewhoclaimrightsundertheConstitution，lawsortreatiesoftheUnitedStates，atrialinthefederalcourts，willberestrictedtotheinsecureremedyofanappealuponaninsulatedpoint，afterithasreceivedthatshapewhichmaybegiventoitbyanothertribunalintowhichbeisforcedagainsthiswill。
\"Wethink，then，thatwhenaquestion，towhichthejudicialpoweroftheUnionisextendedbytheConstitution，formsaningredientoftheoriginalcause，itisinthepowerofcongresstogivethecircuitcourtsjurisdictionofthatcause，althoughotherquestionsoffactoroflawmaybeinvolvedinit。\"3
Fromthesetwodecisionswecollect，amongothermatters，thattheappellatejurisdictiondoesnotdependonthecourtwherethedecisionwasgiven，butonthesubjecttowhichitrelates；thatitisnotnecessarythatthesubjectshouldbepurelyandabstractedlyofasinglenaturewithintheviewoftheConstitution，butmaybeconnectedwithothermatter，andtheentiresubjectsoformed，fallswithintheappellatejurisdiction；thatthisjurisdictionisessentialtothewell-beingofthenation，andthattheSupremeCourthavenotthepowertodeclineitsexercise。Atribunalsohigh，fullysubmittingtoitsconstitutionalobligations，whenmotivesmayeasilybeconceivedofapersonalnature，totemptittorelaxorevadetheirperformance，affordsanexamplefortheimitationofall。4
1。SupposedtobethecaseofHunter\'slesseev。Martin，ofwhichtheparticularsmaybeseenin7Cranch，604，and1Wheaton，304。Theultimateacquiescenceofthestatetribunalrestoredtheharmonyofthegeneralsystem。Heareallfellowcitizens，andallhavebutoneinterest。
2。6Wheaton，413。Cohensv。Virginia。
3。9Wheaton，733。Osbornev。BankoftheUnitedStates。
4。Inthesequotationstheauthorhasretained，withoutapprovingof，theexpressionfederal，frequentlyappliedtothecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Thegovernmentnotbeingstrictlyafederalgovernment，itstribunal\'sarenotproperlyfederaltribunals。
Hereferstohisantecedentremarks，toshowhowlittleofthepurefederativequality，wasintendedtoberetainedinit，norontheotherhand，isitliabletotheobjectionsometimesraised，thatitswarmadvocatesaimatrenderingitaconsolidatedgovernment，destructiveofstatesovereignty。
Theminority，whoatfirstopposeditsadoption，were，nodoubt，sincereinthealarmtheyprofessedinthisrespect:buttimehasprovedthatitisutterlygroundless，andthestatesovereigntiesare，inallrespectsnotvoluntarilycededtotheUnitedStates，asvigorousasever。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXIXCHAPTERXXIX。OFTHERULESOFDECISION。THErulesandprinciplesbywhichthejudicialpoweristobeadministered，formthenextsubjectofconsideration，andherewehave，intheConstitution，thebenefitofatextwhichinsomerespectsisexplicit，andinallothers，suppliesafoundationonwhichitisapprehendedwemaysecurelyrest。
ThelawsoftheUnitedStatesandtreatiesmadeundertheirauthority，formtheexplicitprincipleofthejudiciarypower，andinrespecttotheirhighobligationnoquestioncanarise:butanotherpartofthesamesentenceleadsusintoawiderfieldofinquiry。
TheConstitutionitselfisthesupremelawoftheland，andallcasesarisingunderitaredeclaredtobewithinthejudicialpower。Toeverypartofthiswell-digestedworkweareboundtogiveanefficientconstruction。
Nowordsarethereusedinvain:asaliterarycomposition，theunionofprecisionwithbrevityconstitutesoneofitschiefornamentsandrecommendations。
WhenwefindadistinctionbetweencasesarisingundertheConstitutionandunderlawsandtreaties，wearenotatlibertytosupposethattheformerdescriptionwasintroducedwithoutadefinitemeaning。Theotherdesignationsarenotmoreplainthanthis。Weunderstandwhatismeantbycasesarisingunderlawsandundertreaties，butsomethingmoreisevidentlymeant。WemayrecollectthatinanotherarticleoftheConstitution，lawsmadeinpursuancethereof，andtreatiesmadeundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，aredeclaredtobethesupremelawoftheland。ThesubordinationofalllegislativeactstotheConstitutionistherebyprovidedfor，anditisinconsistentwiththewholeframeofitscompositiontoconsideranypartofitasanuselessrepetitionofwords。Wearethereforeboundtosay，thatcasesmayariseundertheConstitutionwhichdonotariseunderthelaws，andifthispointisconcededorestablished，wearenexttoinquirewhatarethosecases。
OfacivilnaturenothingcanproperlybesaidtoariseundertheConstitution，exceptcontractstowhichtheUnitedStatesareparties。
Jurisdictionisgiventothemovercontroversiesinwhichstatesandindividualsofcertaindescriptionsareconcerned，butthosecaseswouldexistalthoughtheConstitutiondidnotexist。ThecourtsoftheUnitedStatesare，intheserespects，merelytheorgansofjustice，andbythefirstactofcongressrelativetothejudicialestablishment1itisexpresslydeclaredthatthelawsoftheseveralstates，exceptwheretheConstitution，treaties，orstatutesoftheUnitedStatesshallotherwiserequireorprovide，shallberegardedasrulesofdecisionintrialsatcommonlaw，incourtsoftheUnitedStates，incaseswheretheyapply。
Theterm，lawsoftheseveralstatesembracingaswelltheircommonastheirstatutelaws，thereisnodifficultyonthissubject。Itisadmitted，thateverystateintheUnionhasitspeculiarsystemandrulesofdecisionincasesforwhichnopositivestatutesareprovided，andofthesegeneralrulestheUnitedStateshavethebenefitinallcasesofcontractwhichmayoccasionsuitsontheirbehalf，eitherintheirowncourtsorinthoseoftheseveralstates。TotheirowncourtsasimilarpowercouldnotbegivenbycongressunlesswarrantedbytheConstitution，butiftheConstitutiondoeswarrantit，congressmaygiveit。Noonehasdoubtedthatalthoughnoexpressadoptionofthisgeneralprincipleisapparent，itisnecessarilycontainedintheConstitution，inrelationtoallcivilmatters。
Contractsobligatoryontheparty，thoughmerelyimpliedbyreasonofprinciplesnotfoundinthetextofanystatute，butoriginatinginuniversallaw，mayaswellbemadebytheUnitedStatesactingthroughtheagencyoftheirexecutiveofficers，asbyprivateindividuals。Noonehasdoubtedthattheymaybeenforced。ButitcannotbesupposedthatinsuchcasestheUnitedStateswouldbeobligedtohaverecoursetothestatecourtstoobtainredress。
Inrespecttoforeignersandcitizensofdifferentstates，itwouldbeillusoryanddisgraceful，toholduptotheirviewajurisdictiondestituteofthenecessarymeansofexpoundinganddecidingtheircontroversies，andthereforeinferiorinitsefficacytothosestatetribunalsfromwhosesupposedpartialitiesorimperfections，ittenderedanasylum。
Wecannotthereforeotherwiseunderstandtheconstitutionalextensionofjurisdictioninthecasesdescribed，thanasadeclarationthatwhateverreliefwouldbeaffordedbyotherjudicialtribunalsinsimilarcases，shallbeaffordedbythecourtsoftheUnitedStates，orastrangeanomalywouldbepresented。Wemayconsideritasaninherentandavitalprincipleinthejudicialsystem，thatinallcivilcasesthoserulesofdecisionfoundedonreasonandjusticewhichformthebasisofgenerallaw，arewithinthereachandcomposepartsofthepowerofourtribunals。Anditisapprehendedthatalthoughthelegislatureonthecreationofinferiortribunalsunquestionablypossessestherighttodistributethejudicialauthorityamongthem，itcannotcontroltheconstitutionalqualitiesappertainingtosuchportionsofthejudicialpowerasitmayvestinanyoneofthosetribunals。Thusitmaycreateacourtforthetrialofsuitstowhichanalienisaparty，oritmaywhollyomittoinstituteanysuchcourt。Bysuchomission，whatmaybetermedthenationalpromisetoprovideimpartialtribunals，wouldinthisrespectremainunexecuted，butwheneveritwasintendedtoberedeemedbytheerectionofacourt，thenationalpromisewouldonlybefulfilledbythetribunalbeingpossessedofallthepowersnecessarytorenderitefficient。
TheactofSeptember24th，1789，essentiallydependsforitsvalidityontheConstitution。UnlessthelegislatureisauthorizedbytheConstitutiontodeclarethatthelawsoftheseveralstatesshallbetherulesofdecision；
itiscertainthatadeclarationtothateffectwouldbevain。Butthesubjectmaybefurtherpursued。
LegislativeexpositionsoftheConstitution，althoughnotbinding，areentitledtothegreatestrespect?andwhensuchlawsapplyimmediatelytotheactionofthejudicialpower，andarefullyadoptedanduniformlyacteduponbythelatter，ajointsanctionisthusconferredontheconstructiontherebygiventotheConstitution。Nowthememorablelanguageofthisactis，thatintrialsatcommonlaw，thelawsoftheseveralstatesshallgovernthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Butwhencedowederivethefirstposition?BywhatauthoritydothecourtsoftheUnitedStatestrycausesatcommonlaw?UnlesstheConstitutionconfersthispowertheydonotpossessit?nordoescongressprofesstogiveittothem，butconsidersitasalreadygiven。Thelawservesonlytomodifyit，andrenderitmoreconvenientandpracticable。
Inanotherrespect，theviewheretaken，appearstoreceivesomesupportbothfromthesilenceoftheact，andfromjudicialpractice。
Wefindadistinctiontakenbetweencommonlawandequity，notonlyinthesectionbeforementioned，butinthatwhichdescribesthejurisdictionofthecircuitcourt。\"Thecircuitcourtsshallhaveoriginalcognizanceconcurrentwiththecourtsoftheseveralstates，ofallsuitsofacivilnatureatcommonlaworinequity，whentheUnitedStatesareplaintiffsorpetitionedoranalienisaparty，orthesuitisbetweenacitizenofthestatewherethesuitisbroughtandacitizenofanotherstate。\"
Inotherpartsofthesameactthedistinctionisbetweenlaw，withouttheprefix\"common，\"andequity。Theprovisioninregardtothelawsoftheseveralstatesisthereforenotinwordsextendedtosuitsinequity。Andthecoursepursuedhasbeentomakeuseofthoseformsandmodesofproceedingadoptedinthatcountryfromwhich\"wederiveourknowledgeofthe\"principlesofcommonlawandequity。\"Itisobservedthatinsomestatesnocourtofchanceryexists，andcourtsoflawrecogniseandenforceinsuitsatlaw，alltheequitableclaimsandfightswhichacourtofequitywouldrecogniseandenforce；inotherssuchreliefisdenied，andequitableclaimsandrightsareconsideredasmerenullifiesatlaw。Aconstructionthatwouldadoptthestatepracticeinallitsextentwouldextinguishinsomestatestheexerciseofequitablejurisdictionaltogether。2
Where，forwantofacourtofequity，rightsofanequitablecharacterareenforcedinastatecourtoflaw，theUnitedStatescourtswillaffordreliefinthesamemanner。3
Butalthoughtheformsofproceedingareregulatedinthismannerunderanactofcongress，4theprinciplesofdecisionareinnowisemodifiedorregulatedbycongress。TheyarethereforetobedrawndirectlyfromtheConstitution，andtheconstructiongivenbythesupremecourtinthisrespectmustbereceivedasdecisive，thatthewordequitythereintroducedmeansequityasunderstoodinEngland，andnotasitisexpoundedandpractisedonindifferentstates。Yet，perhapsineverystatehavingcourtsofequity，therearevariationsandpeculiaritiesinthesystem。Equityisnottobeviewedasapuresystemofethics，formedonlyonthemoralsense。Everylawyerknowsthatitisnowadefinitescience，ascloselyboundbyprecedentsasthelawitself，anditslocalcharacterwouldseemtorequireasmuchregardfromthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesasthecommonlawofaparticularstate。Itdoesnotappearthatthispointhasyetbeendirectlydecided。
Wehavethereforebeforeus，inallcasesatlaw，arulesoconvenientandappropriate，thatitwouldprobablyhavebeenadoptedbythecourts，ifnoactofcongresshadbeenpassedonthesubject，andwhichwouldbesojustlyapplicabletocasesinequity，thatwemayconsideritlikelytobeadopted，wheneverthenecessityshallarise，andineachrespect，andhoweverthelattermaybesettled，wefindthatincivilcasesthejudicialpowerisnotconfinedtopositivestatutes。
Wenowproceedtotheapplicationofthesameprinciplestoofacriminalnature。5Inamattersoimportant，andonwhichtherehasbeensuchavarietyofopinions，itseemsincumbentdistinctlytostatetheprocessofreasoning，bywhichaconclusionapparentlydifferingfromthatwhichhasinfluencedsomanywiseandvirtuousmembersofourcommunityhasbeenattained。
