And3dly。Ithasoccurredtotheimaginationsofsome，thattherewouldbenosmalldangerthatthegreatpowersofEurope，beinginterestedinhavingafriendinthepresidentoftheUnitedStates，wouldinterposeinhiselection，andthedangersandmisfortunesofPolandberenewedinAmerica。4Inanswertotheseobjections，ithasbeensaidwithgreattruthandforce:
1st。Thatoneilleffectoftheexclusionwouldbeadiminutionoftheinducementstogoodbehaviour。Lesszealwouldbefeltinthedischargeofaduty，whentheadvantageofthestationmustberelinquishedatadeterminateperiod。Thedesireofrewardisoneofthestrongestincentivesofhumanconduct，andthebestsecurityforfidelity，istomakeinterestcoincidewithduty。Eventheloveoffame，therulingpassionofnobleminds，promptingamantoplanandundertakearduousenterprisesforthepublicbenefit，whichmightrequiretimetoperfectthem，woulddeterhimfromtheundertaking，ifheforesawthathemustquitthescenebeforehecouldaccomplishthework，andcommitit，togetherwithhisownreputation，tobandsthatmightbeunequalorunfriendlytothetask。
2dly。Experienceistheparentofwisdom，andhighlydesirableinthefirstmagistrateofanation。Itwouldbeinjuriousandabsurdtodeclare，thatassoonasitisacquired，itspossessorshallbecompelledtoabandonthestationinwhichheacquiredit，andtowhichitisadapted。
3dly。Athirdilleffectoftheexclusionwouldbe，thebanishingmenfromstationsinwhichtheirpresencemightbeofthegreatestmomenttothepublicinterestonparticularemergencies。Anordinancewhichpreventsanationfrommakinguseofitsowncitizens，inthemannerbestsuitedtopeculiarexigenciesandcircumstances，mustbeunwise。Suppose，forinstance，awartoexist，andthepresidenttheninplace，peculiarlyfittedbyhismilitarytalentsandexperiencetoconductittoadvantage:tobeobligedtoexcludehimfromoffice，perhapstosubstituteinexperienceforexperience，andtherebyunhingeandsetafloatthesettledtrainofadministration，mightbeofthegreatest，detriment。5
Theapprehensionoftheinterferenceofforeignnationsinregardtotheofficeofpresident，unlesshewasatfirstelectedforlife，seemstobewithoutfoundation。Whileheiselectedonlyforfouryearsatatime，itisevidentthatitwouldbeofnousetoforeignpowerstocorrupthim，unlesstheycanintimidateorcorruptthosewhoelecthim；butbytheguardedprovisionsoftheConstitution，itisimpossibletoknowforalongtimebeforehand，whothoseelectorswillbe。As，however，thismodeofelectionhasnowbecometheactofthepeople，andtheelectorsaremerelynominal，thewholebodyofthepeople，oratleastamajorityofthem，mustbecorruptedorintimidated，beforesuchaschemecansucceed；
ameasurenotverypracticablebyanyforeignpower。ItiswellknownthatinPoland，thekingwaselected，notbythepeopleatlarge，butbyanaristocraticclass，smallinnumber，andthereforeaccessibletoforeignintrigues。
IfItweredesiredbysuchpowerstoobtainanundueascendancyinourgovernment，theattemptswouldbemade，notonthepresident，butonthemembersofthelegislature，andparticularlyofthesenate，butinnogovernmentisitrecollectedthatanecessaryrotationinofficewaseverimposedonthemembersofthelegislature。
Downtothepresentmoment，nothinginpointoffacthasoccurredamongustoexcitearegretatthecontinuedeligibilityofthesameindividual。
Noundueinfluencehasbeenpractised，andthevoiceofthepeople，sovereigninfact，aswellasintheory，hasbeenindependentlyexercised，bothinthecontinuanceandintheremovaloftheirpublicagents。ThepredominantfeatureoftheAmericancharacter，seems，intruth，tobethatsortofgoodsense，whichinvariablyleadstojustdistinctionsbetweenpartialandgeneralbenefit。Itisnotpretended，thatpartyebullitionsdonotsometimesoverpowerthecalmreflectionofthecommunity，buttheillusionsaretemporary，andthesoundjudgmentwhichneverwhollydepartsfromtheentirebody，ultimatelyrecoversitsascendancy。
Thatuniversalphrenzyofthenation，ofwhichEurope，bothinancientandmoderntimeshasexhibitedinstances，neverfoundplacewithus。Temperateandself-collectedinthemosttryingseasons，Americaalwayspursuedaregularcourse，terminatinginthatsecurityandpeace，whichviolentagitationsandtumultuouspassionscouldnothaveprocured。Theirgoodsensedisplaysitselfintheutterrejectionofpersonalinfluence，whenthepursuitsofthepartyarehostiletothegeneralsentiment。Whatisbelievedtobeforthepublicgood，isneversacrificedtotheviewsofanyindividual，howeverdistinguished。
Buttherearecertainlegitimaterestraintsontheofficeofpresident，whichremovefromthepeopleeverycauseofuneasinessinrespecttoit。
Theserestraintsconsist，inpart，ofthosealreadymentionedinregardtothelegislativebodies。Inthefirstplace，heisequallyboundbytheConstitution，andmustfeetthesameinterestinconformingtoit，thatisfeltbythosebodies。HehasevenlesstodoinrespecttoalterationsoftheConstitutionthanthetwohouseshave。Hecannotrecommendtothepeopleanamendmentofit，andifthetwohousesresolvetosubmitonetothem，hisconcurrenceintheirsodoingisnotrequired，6andperhapswouldnotbeallowed。
Self-interest，(asjustbeforeobserved，)isoneofthestrongestpermanentinfluencesofhumanaction，andwhereveritcanbecoupledwithpublicduty，itaffordsgreatreasonforbelievingthattheywillactinconcert。
Now，ifweconsiderthatthepresident，beingasingleofficer，withoutthosecombinationswhichmaybeformedbythemembersofthetwohouses；
notatanytimeduringhisofficialexistence，returningtoandmixingwiththemassofthepeople，andtherebytosomeextentenabledtodeceiveandmisleadthem；butwhatevermaypersonallybehissocialhabitsandrepublicansimplicity，stillseparatedfromextensivepracticalintercoursebytheverynatureofhisoffice；weshallatonceperceivethatalleyesbeingconstantlyfixedonhim，hismotionswillalwaysbescrupulouslywatched，andsomuchoftheregularexecutionofhispowerasmaybeconsideredtodependonpopularacquiescence，willbediminished，inproportionasheevincesadesigntoextenditbeyonditsconstitutionalbounds。
Norwouldthesupposedinfluenceoftheotherexecutiveofficerssupporthiminsuchcases。Comparedwiththemassofthepeople，theirnumbersaresmall，andtheirverydependenceonhimwouldrenderthemsuspected。
Buttheinterestsofthoseofficerswouldoperateinanotherdirection:
asawilfulinfringementoftheConstitutionwillnaturallyterminateinsomeway，inadestitutionofthepresident\'spower，theirinterestwouldnotbepromotedbycontributingtoaneventinjurioustothemselves，sincehissuccessorwouldofcoursemanifestadeferencetopublicopinionbyremovingallthepromotersandparticipatorsoftheprecedingdelinquency。
TheConstitutionmaythereforebeconsideredashavingastillstrongerholdonthepresident，thanonthelegislativebody。
2dly。If，fromitsnature，anypoliticalorcasualmotivescouldhaveaneffectonthejudicialinterpositionwhenregularlycalledforth，itwouldseemthatitwouldbeexercisedwithmorealacrityagainstasingleofficer，alreadybecomethesubjectofgeneralsuspicionordisapprobation，thanagainstthoseactswhichmustbeconsideredasthemeasuresoftheentiregovernment。
Butthisisaltogetheranillegitimateviewofthecharacterofthejudicialpowerandmodeofaction。Onthecontrary，thepresident，whilelabouringunderpublicreprobation，wouldlookforwardtothejudiciary，withacertainconfidencethatprejudiceanderrorwouldfindnoroominthejudgmentsbywhichthelegalityofhisconductwouldbedecided。
Thischeckuponlamwouldthereforebethemorecompletebybeingunbiassedandcertain。
3dly。But，asbeforeobservedinregardtothelegislature，theopportunityforthisjudicialinterventioninitscommonform，mayberemote，andonetransgressionnotresisted，mayleadtoanother，tilltheaccumulationbecomestooheavytobeborne。
Then，thepowerofthepeoplearisesinitsmajesty，andthroughtheirappropriateorgans，thehouseofrepresentatives，thejudicialpowerisappealedtoinanother，amostimposingandconclusiveform。
ThedignifiedtribunalwhichtheConstitutionhasprovidedforthetrialofimpeachments，hasnowtheeyesofthepublicimmovablyfixedonit。
Guiltorinnocence，notprejudiceorpartymotives，formthegroundofdecision，andalthoughthesenatedoesnotdirectlyvacateorannultheillegalactsthathavetakenplace，whicharestilllefttotheredressoftheordinarytribunals；itpreventsthepossibilityoftheirbeingagaincommittedbythesameindividual，andtheprobabilityoftheirbeingcopiedbyanother。
4thly。Andsoeffectualarethedisqualificationswhichthesenatemaypronounce，thatifthepeople，subsequentlyimposedonandmisledbythediscardedpresidentorhispartisans，wereinclinedagaintoconfideapublictrusttohim，itwouldnotbeintheirpowertodoso。Thesentenceofthesenateisimmutable。
Nosimilarcaution，noanalogousdefenceofthepeopleagainsttheirowndangerousclemencyorforgetfulness，aretobefoundelsewhere。TheostracismofAthens，theinterdictionsfromfireandwaterofRome，thedisqualificationsinsentencesonimpeachmentsinEngland，mightallberepealed，andtheparty，howeverpoliticallydangerous，berestoredtohisformerrank。
Itmaybeinquired，whythepowerofpardoningshouldbeabsolutelyexcludedinsuchacaseasthis?Theanswerhasalreadybeengiven。Thesafetyofthepeopleisthesupremelaw:theirlibertiesproperlyregulatedandsecuredarethecardinalobjectsofrepublicanconstitutions。Thosewhohaveevincedthecapacitytoabuseapublictrustoughtnottohaveasecondopportunitytodoso。Ifitwerepossibletoremovethedisqualificationthussolemnlyimposed，thestatemightbethrownintodisorder；factionsinfavourofthedelinquentbeformed；contrarypretensionsbewarmly，perhapsforciblyasserted?andthebloody，civiccontestsofancientRomemightberenewedonthepollutedarenaofamodernandatemperaterepublic。Itisinfinitelypreferablethatonemanshouldbemeritedlydeprivedofpartoftherightsandprivilegesofcitizenship，thanthatthepeaceandhappinessofthewholecommunityshouldbeendangered。
Thesentenceitselfisattheutmostamildone；buttheobjectofitisstillliabletotheordinaryprocessofjustice。Ifhiscrimeshouldbeofthathighclasswhichsubjectshimtotheforfeitureoflife，thepresidentforthetimebeingstillpossessesthepowertopreventitsinfliction。
Theindividualwiththeaccumulatedweightoftwoconvictions，mightsafelybepardonedinrespecttothesecond。Henevercouldagainbecomeanobjectofpublicconfidence。
Totheseviewsofthechecksuponthisoffice，wemayaddthepowerofthepeople，whenthequadrennialperiodofelectionreturns，toremovehim，whoseconduct，althoughitmaynothaveamountedtoactualdelinquency，hasexcitedeventheirsuspicion。
Referring，withoutrepeatingit，tothelastchapter，wemaythusrecogniseineverypartoftheConstitutionthosecautiousprovisions，forming，adequatechecksoneverypoweritconfers，restrainingallfromdoingwrong，yetnotproductiveofaninconvenientinterferencewitheachotherwhenalldoright；contributingtopreserveanecessarypurityandvigour，andrenderingthemeredistributionofpowerthemeansofcorrectingitsabuse。
1。Seethisboldassertionanditsfeebleillustration，inDelolme，book2，ch。ix。
2。ThestateofMaryland。ThelegislatureofthatstatemayalterorabolishanypartoftheConstitutionorthebillofrights，providedthebillforthatpurposeispassedthreemonthsbeforeanewelection，andisconfirmedbythegeneralassemblyatthefirstsessionaftersuchelection，theobjectofwhichprovisoundoubtedlyistoaffordthepeopleanopportunitytotestifybytheremovalofthemembersadisapprobationoftheirmeasures。
3。ByDelolme，inthechapteralreadyreferredto。
4。SeedebatesinVirginiaconvention，vol。iii。p。67。
5。Federalist，No。72。
6。4Hollingsworthv。Virginia，3Dallas，378。
WilliamRawle:AViewoftheConstitution:ChapterXXXIICHAPTERXXXII。OFTHEPERMANENCEOFTHEUNION。Quassatarespublicamultaperderetetornamentadignitatisetpræ；sidiastabilitatissuæ；。OratioproMarcello。HAVINGthusendeavouredtodelineatethegeneralfeaturesofthispeculiarandinvaluableformofgovernment，weshallconcludewithadvertingtotheprinciplesofitscohesion，andtotheprovisionsitcontainsforitsowndurationandextension。
ThesubjectcannotperhapsbebetterintroducedthanbypresentinginitsownwordsanemphaticalclauseintheConstitution。
TheUnitedStatesshallguaranteetoeverystateintheUnionarepublicanformofgovernment，shallprotecteachofthemagainstinvasion，andonapplicationofthelegislature，oroftheexecutivewhenthelegislaturecannotbeconvened，againstdomesticviolence。
TheUnionisanassociationofthepeopleofrepublics；itspreservationiscalculatedtodependonthepreservationofthoserepublics。Thepeopleofeachpledgethemselvestopreservethatformofgovernmentinall。Thuseachbecomesresponsibletotherest，thatnootherformofgovernmentshallprevailinit，andallareboundtopreserveitineveryone。
Butthemerecompact，withoutthepowertoenforceit，wouldbeoflittlevalue。Nowthispowercanbenowheresoproperlylodged，asintheUnionitself。Hence，thetermguarantee，indicatesthattheUnitedStatesareauthorizedtooppose，andifpossible，preventeverystateintheUnionfromrelinquishingtherepublicanformofgovernment，andasauxiliarymeans，theyareexpresslyauthorizedandrequiredtoemploytheirforceontheapplicationoftheconstitutedauthoritiesofeachstate，\"torepressdomesticviolence。\"Ifafactionshouldattempttosubvertthegovernmentofastateforthepurposeofdestroyingitsrepublicanform，thepaternalpoweroftheUnioncouldthusbecalledforthtosubdueit。
Yetitisnottobeunderstood，thatitsinterpositionwouldbejustifiable，ifthepeopleofastateshoulddeterminetoretirefromtheUnion，whethertheyadoptedanotherorretainedthesameformofgovernment，oriftheyshould，withthe，expressintentionofseceding，expungetherepresentativesystemfromtheircode，andtherebyincapacitatethemselvesfromconcurringaccordingtothemodenowprescribed，inthechoiceofcertainpublicofficersoftheUnitedStates。
Theprincipleofrepresentation，althoughcertainlythewisestandbest，isnotessentialtothebeingofarepublic，buttocontinueamemberoftheUnion，itmustbepreserved，andthereforetheguaranteemustbesoconstrued。Itdependsonthestateitselftoretainorabolishtheprincipleofrepresentation，becauseitdependsonitselfwhetheritwillcontinueamemberoftheUnion。Todenythisrightwouldbeinconsistentwiththeprincipleonwhichallourpoliticalsystemsarefounded，whichis，thatthepeoplehaveinallcases，arighttodeterminehowtheywillbegoverned。
Thisrightmustbeconsideredasaningredientintheoriginalcompositionofthegeneralgovernment，which，thoughnotexpressed，wasmutuallyunderstood，andthedoctrineheretoforepresentedtothereaderinregardtotheindefeasiblenatureofpersonalallegiance，issofarqualifiedinrespecttoallegiancetotheUnitedStates。Itwasobserved，thatitwascompetentforastatetomakeacompactwithitscitizens，thatthereciprocalobligationsofprotectionandallegiancemightceaseoncertainevents；anditwasfurtherobserved，thatallegiancewouldnecessarilyceaseonthedissolutionofthesocietytowhichitwasdue。
Thestates，then，maywhollywithdrawfromtheUnion，butwhiletheycontinue，theymustretainthecharacterofrepresentativerepublics。Governmentsofdissimilarformsandprinciplescannotlongmaintainabindingcoalition。
\"Greece，\"saysMontesquieu，\"wasundoneassoonasthekingofMacedonobtainedaseatintheamphyctioniccouncil。\"1Itisprobable，however，thatthedisproportionateforceaswellasthemonarchicalformofthenewconfederatehaditsshareofinfluenceintheevent。Butwhetherthehistoricalfactsupportsthetheoryornot，theprincipleinrespecttoourselvesisunquestionable。
Wehaveassociatedasrepublics。Possessingthepowertoformmonarchies，republicswerepreferredandinstituted。Thehistoryoftheancient，andthestateofthepresentworld，arebeforeus。Ofmodernrepublics，Venice，Florence，theUnitedProvinces，Genoa，allbutSwitzerlandhavedisappeared。
Theyhavesunkbeneaththepowerofmonarchy，impatientatbeholdingtheexistence，ofanyotherformthanitsown。AninjuredprovinceofTurkey，recallingtoitsmindtheillustriousdeedsofitsancestors，hasventuredtoresistitsoppressors，andwitharevivalofthenameofGreece，ahopeisentertainedofthepermanentinstitutionofanotherrepublic。Butmonarchystandsbywithajealousaspect，andfearfullestitsownpowershouldbeendangeredbytherevivalofthemaxim，thatsovereigntycaneverresideinthepeople，affectsacoldneutrality，withtheprobableanticipationthatitwillinducetobarbariansuccess。Yetthatgallantcountry，itistrusted，willpersevere。Anenlightenedpeople，disciplinedthroughnecessity，andemboldenedevenbythegloomofitsprospects，mayaccomplishwhatitwouldnotdaretohope。2
Thisabstractprinciple，thisaversiontotheextensionofrepublicanfreedom，isnowinvigoratedandenforcedbyanallianceavowedlyforthepurposeofoverpoweringalleffortstorelievemankindfromtheirshackles。
Itisessentiallyandprofessedlytheexaltationofmonarchiesoverrepublics，andevenovereveryalterationintheformsofmonarchy，tendingtoacknowledgeorsecuretherightsofthepeople。Theexistenceofsuchacombinationwarrantsandrequiresthatinsomepartofthecivilizedworld，therepublicansystemshouldbeabletodefenditself。Butthiswouldbeimperfectlydone，bytheerectionofseparate，independent，thoughcontiguousgovernments。
Theymustbecollectedintoabody，stronginproportiontothefirmnessofitsunion；respectedandfearedinproportiontoitsstrength。TheprincipleonwhichalonetheUnionisrenderedvaluable，andwhichalonecancontinueit，isthepreservationoftherepublicanform。
Inwhatmannerthisguarantyshallbeeffectuatedisnotexplained，anditpresentsaquestionofconsiderablenicetyandimportance。
NotawordintheConstitutionisintendedtobeinoperative，andonesosignificantasthepresentwasnotlightlyinserted。TheUnitedStatesarethereforeboundtocarryitintoeffectwhenevertheoccasionarises，andfindingaswedo，inthesameclause，theengagementtoprotecteachstateagainstdomesticviolence，whichcanonlybebythearmsoftheUnion，weareassistedinadueconstructionofthemeansofenforcingtheguaranty。
Ifthemajorityofthepeopleofastatedeliberatelyandpeaceablyresolvetorelinquishtherepublicanformofgovernment，theyceasetobemembersoftheUnion。Ifafaction，aninferiornumber，makesuchaneffort，andendeavourtoenforceitbyviolence，thecaseprovidedforwillhavearisen，andtheUnionisboundtoemployitspowertopreventit。
ThepoweranddutyoftheUnitedStatestointerferewiththeparticularconcernsofastatearenot，however，limitedtotheviolenteffortsofapartytoalteritsconstitution。Iffromanyothermotives，orunderanyotherpretexts，theinternalpeaceandorderofthestatearedisturbed，anditsownpowersareinsufficienttosuppressthecommotion，itbecomesthedutyofitspropergovernmenttoapplytotheUnionforprotection。
ThisisfoundedonthesoundprinciplethatthoseinwhomtheforceoftheUnionisvested，indiminutionofthepowerformerlypossessedbythestate，areboundtoexerciseitforthegoodofthewhole，andupontheobviousanddirectinterestthatthewholepossessesinthepeaceandtranquillityofeverypart。Atthesametimeitisproperlyprovided，inorderthatsuchinterferencemaynotwantonlyorarbitrarilytakeplace；thatitshallonlybe，ontherequestofthestateauthorities:otherwisetheself-governmentofthestatemightbeencroacheduponatthepleasureoftheUnion，andasmallstatemightfearorfeeltheeffectsofacombinationoflargerstatesagainstitundercolourofconstitutionalauthority；butitismanifest，thatineverypartofthisexcellentsystem，therehasbeentheutmostcaretoavoidencroachmentsontheinternalpowersofthedifferentstates，wheneverthegeneralgooddidnotimperiouslyrequireit。
Noformofapplicationforthisassistanceispointedout，norhasbeenprovidedbyanyactofcongress，butthenaturalcoursewouldbetoapplytothepresident，orofficerforthetimebeing，exercisinghisfunctions。
NooccasionalactofthelegislatureoftheUnitedStatesseemstobenecessary，wherethedutyofthepresidentispointedoutbytheConstitution，andgreatinjurymightbesustained，ifthepowerwasnotpromptlyexercised。
Intheinstanceofforeigninvasion，thedutyofimmediateandunsolicitedprotectionisobvious，butthegenericterminvasion，whichisusedwithoutanyqualification，mayrequireabroaderconstruction。
Ifamongtheimprobableeventsoffuturetimes，weshallseeastateforgetfulofitsobligationtoreferitscontroversieswithanotherstatetothejudicialpoweroftheUnion，endeavourbyforcetoredressitsrealorimaginarywrongs，andactuallyinvadetheotherstate，weshallperceiveacaseinwhichthesupremepoweroftheUnionmayjustlyinterfere；perhapswemaysayisboundtodoso。
Theinvadedstate，insteadofrelyingmerelyonitsownstrengthfordefence，andinsteadofgratifyingitsrevengebyretaliation，mayprudentlycallforandgratefullyreceivethestrongarmoftheUniontorepeltheinvasion，andreducethecombatantstotheequallevelofsuitorsinthehightribunalprovidedforthem。Inthiscourse，thepoliticalestimationofneitherstatecouldreceiveanydegradation。Thedecisionofthecontroversywouldonlyberegulatedbythepurestprinciplesofjustice，andthepartyreallyinjured，wouldbecertainofhavingthedecreeinitsfavourcarriedintoeffect。ItrestswiththeUnion，andnotwiththestatesseparatelyorindividually，toincreasethenumberofitsmembers。3Theadmissionofanotherstatecanonlytakeplaceonitsownapplication。
Wehavealreadyseen，thatintheformationofcoloniesunderthedenominationofterritories，thehabithasbeen，toassuretothemtheirformationintostateswhenthepopulationshouldbecomesufficientlylarge。Onthatevent，theinhabitantsacquirearighttoassembleandformaconstitutionforthemselves，andtheUnitedStatesareconsideredasboundtoadmitthenewstateintotheUnion，provideditsformofgovernmentbethatofarepresentativerepublic。ThisistheonlycheckorcontrolpossessedbytheUnitedStatesinthisrespect。
Ifameasuresoimprobableshouldoccurinthecolony，astheadoptionofamonarchicalgovernment，itcouldnotbereceivedintotheUnion，althoughitassumedtheappellationofastate，buttheguarantyofwhichwehavespoken，wouldnotliterallyapply?theguarantyisintendedtosecurerepublicaninstitutionstostates，anddoesnotintermsextendtocolonies。
Assoon，however，asastateisformedoutofacolony，andadmittedintotheUnion，itbecomesthecommonconcerntoenforcethecontinuanceoftherepublicanform。Therecanbenodoubt，however，thatthenewstatemaydeclinetoapplyforadmissionintotheUnionbutitdoesnotseemequallyclear，thatifitsformofgovernmentcoincidedwiththerulesalreadymentioned，itsadmissioncouldberefused。TheinhabitantsemigratefromtheUnitedStates，andforeignersarepermittedtosettle，undertheexpressorimpliedcompact，thatwhenthepropertimearrives，theyshallbecomemembersofthegreatnationalcommunity，withoutbeinglefttoanexposedandunassistedindependence，orcompelledtothrowthemselvesintothearmsofaforeignpower。Itwouldseem，however，thattheconstitutionadopted，oughttobesubmittedtotheconsiderationofcongress，butitwouldnotbenecessarythatthismeasureshouldtakeplaceatthetimeofitsformation，anditwouldbesufficientifitwerepresentedandapprovedatthetimeofitsadmission。Thepracticeofcongresshasnot，however，correspondedwiththesepositions，nopreviousapprobationoftheconstitutionhasbeendeemednecessary。
Itmustalsobeconceded，thatthepeopleofthenewstateretainthesamepowertoaltertheirconstitution，thatisenjoyedbythepeopleoftheolderstates，andprovidedsuchalterationsarenotcarriedsofarastoextinguishtherepublicanprinciple，theiradmissionisnotaffected。
ThesecessionofastatefromtheUniondependsonthewillofthepeopleofsuchstate。Thepeoplealoneaswehavealreadyseen，boldthepowertoaltertheirconstitution。TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesistoacertainextent，incorporatedintotheconstitutionsortheseveralstatesbytheactofthepeople。Thestatelegislatureshaveonlytoperformcertainorganicaloperationsinrespecttoit。TowithdrawfromtheUnioncomesnotwithinthegeneralscopeoftheirdelegatedauthority。Theremustbeanexpresspro-visiontothateffectinsertedinthestateconstitutions。
Thisisnotatpresentthecasewithanyofthem，anditwouldperhapsbeimpolitictoconfideittothem。Amattersomomentous，oughtnottobeentrustedtothosewhowouldhaveitintheirpowertoexerciseitlightlyandprecipitatelyuponsuddendissatisfaction，orcauselessjealousy，perhapsagainsttheinterestsandthewishesofamajorityoftheirconstituents。
Butinanymannerbywhichasecessionistotakeplace，nothingismorecertainthanthattheactshouldbedeliberate，clear，andunequivocal。
Theperspicuityandsolemnityoftheoriginalobligationrequirecorrespondentqualitiesinitsdissolution。Thepowersofthegeneralgovernmentcannotbedefeatedorimpairedbyanambiguousorimpliedsecessiononthepartofthestate，althoughasecessionmayperhapsbeconditional。Thepeopleofthestatemayhavesomereasonstocomplaininrespecttoactsofthegeneralgovernment，theymayinsuchcasesinvestsomeoftheirownofficerswiththepowerofnegotiation，andmaydeclareanabsolutesecessionincaseoftheirfailure。Still，however，thesecessionmustinsuchcasebedistinctlyandperemptorilydeclaredtotakeplaceonthatevent，andinsuchcase?asinthecaseofanunconditionalsecession，?thepreviousligamentwiththeUnion，wouldbelegitimatelyandfairlydestroyed。Butineithercasethepeopleistheonlymovingpower。
Asuggestionrelativetothispartofthesubjecthasappearedinprint，whichtheauthorconceivestorequirenotice。
Ithasbeenlaiddownthatifallthestates，oramajorityofthem，refusetoelectsenators，thelegislativepowersoftheUnionwillbesuspended。4
Ofthefirstofthesesupposedcasestherecanbenodoubt。Ifoneofthenecessarybranchesoflegislationiswhollywithdrawn，therecanbenofurtherlegislation，butifapart，althoughthegreaterpartofeitherbranchshouldbewithdrawnitwouldnotaffectthepowerofthosewhoremained。
InnopartoftheConstitutionisaspecificnumberofstatesrequiredforalegislativeact。Underthearticlesofconfederationtheconcurrenceofninestateswasrequisiteformanypurposes。IffivestateshadwithdrawnfromthatUnion，itwouldhavebeendissolved。InthepresentConstitutionthereisnospecificationofnumbersafterthefirstformation。Itwasforeseenthattherewouldbeanaturaltendencytoincreasethenumberofstateswiththeincreaseofpopulationthenanticipatedandnowsofullyverified。Itwasalsoknown，thoughitwasnotavowed，thatastatemightwithdrawitselfThenumberwouldthereforebevariable。
InnopartoftheConstitutionisthereareferencetoanyproportionofthestates，exceptinthetwosubjectsofamendments，andofthechoiceofpresidentandvice-president。
Inthefirstcase，two-thirdsorthree-fourthsoftheseveralstatesisthelanguageused，anditsignifiesthoseproportionsoftheseveralstatesthatshallthenformtheUnion。
Inthesecond，thereisaremarkabledistinctionbetweenthechoiceofpresidentandvicepresident，incaseofanequalityofvotesforeither。
Thehouseofrepresentatives，votingbystates，istoselectoneofthethreepersonshavingthehighestnumber，forpresident，aquorumforthispurposeshallconsistofamemberormembersfromtwo-thirdsofthestates，andamajorityofallthestatesshallbenecessaryforthechoice。
Thesenatenotvotingbystates，butbytheirmembersindividually，asinallothercases，selectsthevicepresidentfromthetwopersonshavingthehighestnumberonthelist。Aquorumforthispurposeshallconsistoftwo-thirdsofthewholenumberofsenators，andamajorityissufficientforthechoice。
Now，ifbytheomissionofthelegislatorsofmorethanonethirdofthestates，therewerenosenatorsfromsuchstates，thequestionwouldarisewhetherthequorumispredicatedofthestatesrepresented，orofallthestates，whetherrepresentedornot。
Theformeropinionismostconsistentwiththegeneralrule，thatweshouldalwayspreferaconstructionthatwillsupport，toonethathasatendencytodestroyaninstrumentorasystem。Othercausesthandesignonthepartofastatelegislature，maybeimaginedtooccasionsomestatestobeunrepresentedinthesenateatthemoment。
Itseemstobethesafest，andispossiblythesoundestconstruction，toconsiderthequorumasintendedtobecomposedoftwo-thirdsofthethenexistingsenators。
Butwemaypursuethesubjectsomewhatfurther。
TowithdrawfromtheUnionisasolemn，seriousact。Wheneveritmayappearexpedienttothepeopleofastate，itmustbemanifestedinadirectandunequivocalmanner。Ifitiseverdoneindirectly，thepeoplemustrefusetoelectrepresentatives，aswellastosuffertheirlegislaturetore-appointsenators。Thesenatorwhosetimehadnotyetexpired，mustbeforbiddentocontinueintheexerciseofhisfunctions。
Butwithoutplain，decisivemeasuresofthisnature，proceedingfromtheonlylegitimatesource，thepeople，theUnitedStatescannotconsidertheirlegislativepowersoversuchstatessuspended，northeirexecutiveorjudicialpowersanywayimpaired，andtheywouldnotbeobligedtodesistfromthecollectionofrevenuewithinsuchstate。
Astotheremainingstatesamongthemselves，thereisnoopeningforadoubt。
Secessionsmayreducethenumbertothesmallestintegeradmittingcombination。
Theywouldremainunitedunderthesameprinciplesandregulationsamongthemselvesthatnowapplytothewhole。ForastatecannotbecompelledbyotherstatestowithdrawfromtheUnion，andtherefore，iftwoormoredeterminetoremainunited，althoughalltheothersdesertthem，nothingcanbediscoveredintheConstitutiontopreventit。
Theconsequencesofanabsolutesecessioncannotbemistaken，andtheywouldbeseriousandafflicting。
Thesecedingstate，whatevermightbeitsrelativemagnitude，wouldspeedilyanddistinctlyfeelthelossoftheaidandcountenanceoftheUnion。TheUnionlosingaproportionofthenationalrevenue，wouldbeentitledtodemandfromitaproportionofthenationaldebt。Itwouldbeentitledtotreattheinhabitantsandthecommerceoftheseparatedstate，asappertainingtoaforeigncountry。Inpublictreatiesalreadymade，whethercommercialorpolitical，itcouldclaimnoparticipation，whileforeignpowerswouldunwillinglycalculate，andslowlytransfertoit，anyportionoftherespectandconfidencebornetowardstheUnitedStates。
Evilsmorealarmingmayreadilybeperceived。Thedestructionofthecommonhandwouldbeunavoidablyattendedwithmoreseriousconsequencesthanthemeredisunionoftheparts。
Separationwouldproducejealousiesanddiscord，whichintimewouldripenintomutualhostilities，andwhileourcountrywouldbeweakenedbyinternalwar，foreignenemieswouldbeencouragedtoinvadewiththeflatteringprospectofsubduingindetail，thosewhom，collectively，theywoulddreadtoencounter。
SuchinancienttimeswasthefateofGreece，brokenintonumerousindependentrepublics。Rome，whichpursuedacontrarypolicy，andabsorbedallherterritorialacquisitionsinonegreatbody，attainedirresistiblepower。
Butitmaybeobjected，thatRomealsohasfallen。Itistrue；andsuchisthehistoryofman。Naturallifeandpoliticalexistencealikegivewayattheappointedmeasureoftime，andthebirth，decay，andextinctionofempiresonlyservetoprovethetenuityandillusionofthedeepestschemesofthestatesman，andthemostelaboratetheoriesofthephilosopher。
Yetitisalwaysourdutytoinquireinto，andestablishthoseplansandformsofcivilassociationmostconducivetopresenthappinessandlongduration:therestwemustleavetoDivineProvidence，whichhithertohassograciouslysmiledontheUnitedStatesofAmerica。
WemaycontemplateadissolutionoftheUnioninanotherlight，moredisinterestedbutnotlessdignified，andconsiderwhetherwearenotonlyboundtoourselvesbuttotheworldingeneral，anxiouslyandfaithfullytopreserveit。
Thefirstexamplewhichhasbeenexhibitedofaperfectself-government，successfulbeyondthewarmesthopesofits，authors，oughtnevertobewithdrawnwhilethemeansofpreservingitremain。
Ifinothercountries，andparticularlyinEurope，asystematicsubversionofthepoliticalrightsofmanshallgraduallyoverpowerallrationalfreedom，andendangerallpoliticalhappiness，thefailureofourexampleshouldnotbeheldupasadiscouragementtothelegitimateoppositionofthesufferers；if，ontheotherhand，anemancipatedpeopleshouldseekamodelonwhichtoframetheirownstructure；ourConstitution，aspermanentinitsdurationasitissoundandsplendidinitsprinciples，shouldremaintobetheirguide。
Ineveryaspectthereforewhichthisgreatsubjectpresents，wefeelthedeepestimpressionofasacredobligationtopreservetheunionofourcountry；wefeelourglory，oursafety，andourhappiness，involvedinit；weunitetheinterestsofthosewhocoldlycalculateadvantageswiththosewhoglowwithwhatislittleshortoffilialaffection；andwemustresisttheattemptofitsowncitizenstodestroyit，withthesamefeelingsthatweshouldavertthedaggeroftheparricide。
Thisworkcannotperhapsbebetterconcludedthanwithaquotationfromthevaledictoryaddressofonewhosecharacterstampsinestimablevalueonallthatliehasuttered，andwhoseexhortationsonthissubject，springingfromthepurestpatriotismandthesoundestwisdom，oughtnevertobeforgottenorneglected。5
InthisaddressWashingtonexpressedhimselfasfollows:?
\"ThenameofAmerican，whichbelongstoyouinyournationalcapacity，mustalwaysexaltthejustprideofpatriotism，morethananyappellationderivedfromlocaldiscriminations。Withslightshadesofdifference，youhavethesamereligion，manners，habits，andpoliticalprinciples?
youhaveinacommoncausefoughtandtriumphedtogether；theindependenceandlibertyyoupossess，aretheworkofjointcounsels，andjointefforts，ofcommondangers，sufferings，andsuccesses。
\"Buttheseconsiderations，howeverpowerfullytheyaddressthemselvestoyoursensibility，aregreatlyoutweighedbythosewhichapplymoreimmediatelytoyourinterest。Hereeveryportionofourcountryfindsthemostcommandingmotivesforcarefullyguardingandpreservingtheunionofthewhole。
\"TheNorthinanunrestrainedintercoursewiththeSouth，protectedbytheequallawsofacommongovernment，findsintheproductionsofthelatter，greatadditionalresourcesofmaritimeandcommercialenterprise，andpreciousmaterialsofmanufacturingindustry。
\"TheSouth，inthesameintercourse，benefitingbythesameagencyoftheNorth，seesitsagriculturegrowanditscommerceexpand。
TurningpartlyintoitsownchannelstheseamenoftheNorth，itfindsitsparticularnavigationinvigorated，andwhileitcontributesindifferentwaystonourishandincreasethegeneralmassofthenationalnavigation，itlooksforwardtotheprotectionofamaritimestrength，towhichitselfisunequallyadapted。TheEastinalikeintercoursewiththeWest，alreadyfinds，andintheprogressiveimprovementofinteriorcommunicationsbylandandwater，willmoreandmorefind，avaluableventforthecommoditieswhichitbringsfromabroadormanufacturesathome。TheWestderivesfromtheEastsuppliesrequisitetoitsgrowthandcomfort，andwhatisperhapsofstillgreaterconsequence，itmustofnecessityowethesecureenjoymentofindispensableoutletsforitsownproductions，totheweight，influence，andthefuturemaritimestrengthoftheAtlanticsideoftheUnion，directedbyanindissolublecommunityofinterestasonenation。AnyothertenurebywhichtheWestcanholdthisessentialadvantage，whetherderivedfromitsownseparatestrength，orfromanapostateandunnaturalconnexionwithanyforeignpower，mustbeintrinsicallyprecarious。
\"While，then，everypartofourcountrythusfeelsanimmediateandparticularinterestinunion，allthepartscombinedcannotfailtofindintheunitedmassofmeansandefforts，greaterstrength，greaterresource，proportionablygreatersecurityfromexternaldanger，alessfrequentinterruptionoftheirpeacebyforeignnations，andwhatisofinestimablevalue，theymustderivefromunionanexemptionfromthosebroilsandwarsbetweenthemselveswhichsofrequentlyafflictneighbouringcountries，nottiedtogetherbythesamegovernment，whichtheirownrivalshipsalonewouldbesufficienttoproduce，butwhichoppositeforeignalliances，attachments，andintrigues，wouldstimulateandembitter。Hence，likewise，theywillavoidthenecessityofthoseovergrownmilitaryestablishments，which，underanyformofgovernmentareinauspicioustoliberty，andwhicharetoberegardedasparticularlyhostiletorepublicanliberty。Inthissense，itisthatyourunionoughttobeconsideredasamainpropofyourliberty，andthattheloveoftheoneoughttoendeartoyouthepreservationoftheother。
\"Theseconsiderationsspeakapersuasivelanguagetoeveryreflectingandvirtuousmind，andexhibitthecontinuanceoftheUnionasaprimaryobjectofpatrioticdesire。Isthereadoubtwhetheracommongovernmentcanembracesolargeasphere?Letexperiencesolveit。Tolistentomerespeculationinsuchacasewerecriminal。Weareauthorisedtohopethataproperorganizationofthewhole，withtheauxiliaryagencyofgovernmentsfortherespectivesubdivisions，willaffordahappyissuetotheexperiment。
Withsuchpowerfulandobviousmotivestounion，affectingallpartsofourcountry，whileexperienceshallnothavedemonstrateditsimpracticability，therewillalwaysbereasontodistrustthepatriotismofthosewhoinanyquartermayendeavourtoweakenitshands。\"
1。Federalist，No。43。
2。Sincethispassagewaswritten，theaffairsofGreecehaveassumedsomewhatofadifferentaspect。TheTurkishfleethasbeenaccidentallydestroyedbythecombinedpowers，andtheFrenchhavelandedabodyofmen，withanapparentintentiontopromotetheindependenceofthisafflictedcountry。
