Before，however，weattempttodefineparticularvirtuesordepartmentsofduty，itwillbewelltoexaminefurtherthenotionsofDutyandVirtueingeneral，andtherelationsbetweenthetwo，aswefindthemimplicitlyconceivedbythecommonsenseofmankind，whichweareendeavouringtoexpress。HithertoIhavetakenDutytobebroadlyconvertiblewithRightconduct:Ihavenoticed，however，thattheformerterm——like``ought’’and``moralobligation’’——impliesatleastthepotentialpresenceofmotivespromptingtowrongconduct；andisthereforenotapplicabletobeingstowhomnosuchconflictofmotivescanbeattributed。ThusGodisnotconceivedasperformingduties，thoughHeisconceivedasrealisingJusticeandotherkindsofRightnessinaction。Forasimilarreason，wedonotcommonlyapplytheterm`duty’torightactions——howevernecessaryandimportant——whenwearesostronglyimpelledtothembynon-moralinclinationsthatnomoralimpulseisconceivedtobenecessaryfortheirperformance。
Thuswedonotsaygenerallythatitisadutytoeatanddrinkenough:
thoughwedooftensaythistoinvalidswhohavelosttheirappetite。WeshouldthereforeperhapskeepmostclosetousageifwedefinedDutiesas`thoseRightactionsorabstinences，fortheadequateaccomplishmentofwhichamoralimpulseisconceivedtobeatleastoccasionallynecessary’。
Butasthislineofdistinctionisvague，andcontinuallyvarying，Ishallnotthinkitnecessarytodrawattentiontoitinthedetaileddiscussionofduties:itseemssufficienttopointoutthatweshallbechieflyconcernedwithsuchrightconductascomeswithinthedefinitionjustsuggested。
Itmaybesaid，however，thatthereisanotherimplicationintheterm``duty’’whichIhavesofaroverlooked，butwhichitsderivation-andthatoftheequivalentterm`obligation’plainlyindicates:
viz。thatitis``due’’orowedtosomeone。ButIthinkthatherethederivationdoesnotgoverntheestablishedusage:rather，itiscommonlyrecognisedthatdutiesowedtopersons，or``relative’’duties，areonlyonespecies，andthatsomeduties——as(e。g。)Truth-speaking——havenosuchrelativity。Nodoubtitispossibletoviewanydutyasrelativetothepersonorpersonsimmediatelyaffectedbyitsperformance；butitisnotusualtodothiswheretheimmediateeffectsareharmful——aswheretruth-speakingcausesaphysicallyinjuriousshocktothepersonaddressed——:
andthoughitmaystillbeconceivedtobeultimatelygoodforsociety，andso``due’’tothecommunityortohumanityatlarge，thattruthshouldeveninthiscasebespoken，thisconceptionhardlybelongstotheintuitionalviewthat`truthshouldbespokenregardlessofconsequences’。Again，itmaybethoughtbyreligiouspersonsthattheperformanceofdutiesisowednottothehumanorotherlivingbeingsaffectedbythem，buttoGodastheauthorofthemorallaw。AndIcertainlywouldnotdenythatourcommonconceptionofdutyinvolvesanimpliedrelationofanindividualwilltoauniversalwillconceivedasperfectlyrational:butIamnotpreparedtoaffirmthatthisimplicationisnecessary，andanadequatediscussionofthedifficultiesinvolvedinitwouldleadtometaphysicalcontroversieswhichIamdesirousofavoiding。Ipropose，therefore，inthisexpositionoftheIntuitionalmethod，toabstractfromthisrelationofDutygenerallytoaDivineWill:and，forreasonspartlysimilar，toleaveoutofconsiderationtheparticular``dutiestoGod’’whichIntuitionistshaveoftendistinguishedandclassified。Ourviewofthegeneralrulesof``dutytoman’’(ortootheranimals)——sofarassuchrulesareheldtobecognisablebymoralintuition——will，Iconceive，remainthesame，whetherornotweregardsuchrulesasimposedbyaSupremeRationalWill:sinceinanycasetheywillbesuchasweholditrationalforallmentoobey，andthereforesuchasaSupremeReasonwouldimpose。Ishallnotthereforetreattheterm``Duty’’asimplyingnecessarilyarelationeithertoauniversalImponentortotheindividualsprimarilyaffectedbytheperformanceofduties:butshalluseitasequivalentgenerallytoRightconduct，whilepracticallyconcentratingattentiononactsandabstinencesforwhichamoralimpulseisthoughttobemoreorlessrequired。
ThenotionofVirtuepresentsmorecomplexityanddifficulty，andrequirestobediscussedfromdifferentpointsofview。Wemaybeginbynoticingthatthereseemtobesomeparticularvirtues(suchasGenerosity)whichmayberealisedinactsobjectively——thoughnotsubjectively——wrong，fromwantofinsightintotheirconsequences:
andevensome(suchasCourage)whichmaybeexhibitedinwrongactsthatareknownbytheagenttobesuch。Butthoughthecontemplationofsuchactsexcitesinusaquasi-moraladmiration，inthelattercasewecertainlyshouldnotcallthemvirtuous，anditisdoubtfulwhetherweshoulddosointheformercase，ifwewereusingthetermstrictly。Itwillthereforeinvolvenomaterialdeviationfromusage，ifwelimittheterm``Virtue’’
toqualitiesexhibitedinrightconduct:accordinglyIproposetoadoptthislimitationinsubsequentdiscussions。
Howfar，then，arewetoregardthespheresofDutyandVirtue(thusdefined)asco-extensive？Toagreatextenttheyundoubtedlyareso，inthecommonapplicationoftheterms，butnotaltogether:
sinceinitscommonuseeachtermseemstoincludesomethingexcludedfromtheother。Weshouldscarcelysaythatitwasvirtuous——underordinarycircumstances——topayone’sdebts，orgiveone’schildrenadecenteducation，orkeepone’sagedparentsfromstarving；thesebeingdutieswhichmostmenperform，andonlybadmenneglect。Ontheotherhand，thereareactsofhighandnoblevirtuewhichwecommonlyregardasgoingbeyondthestrictdutyoftheagent；since，whilewepraisetheirperformance，wedonotcondemntheirnon-performance。Here，however，adifficultyseemstoarise；
forweshouldnotdenythatitis，insomesense，aman’sstrictdutytodowhateveractionhejudgesmostexcellent，sofarasitisinhispower。
Butcanwesaythatitisasmuchinaman’spowertorealiseVirtueasitistofulfilDuty？Tosomeextent，nodoubt，weshouldsaythis:noqualityofconductisevercalledavirtueunlessitisthoughttobetosomeextentimmediatelyattainableatwillbyallordinarypersons，whencircumstancesgiveopportunityforitsmanifestation。Infactthelinebetweenvirtuesandotherexcellencesofbehaviouriscommonlydrawnbythischaracteristicofvoluntariness；——anexcellencewhichwethinknoeffortofwillcouldatonceenableustoexhibitinanyappreciabledegreeiscalledagift，grace，ortalent，butnotproperlyavirtue。WriterslikeHume，whoobliteratethisline，divergemanifestlyfromcommonsense。StillIregarditasmanifestlyparadoxicaltomaintainthatitisinthepowerofanyoneatanytimetorealisevirtueinthehighestformordegree；(e。g。)noonewouldaffirmthatanyordinarymancanatwillexhibitthehighestdegreeofcourage——inthesenseinwhichcourageisavirtue——whenoccasionarises。
Itwouldseem，therefore，thatwecandistinguishamarginofvirtuousconduct，whichmaybebeyondthestrictdutyofanyindividualasbeingbeyondhispower。
Canwethen，excludingthismargin，saythatvirtuousconduct，sofarasitisinaman’spower，coincidescompletelywithhisduty？Certainlyweshouldagreethatatrulymoralmancannotsaytohimself，``Thisisthebestthingonthewholeformetodo，butyetitisnotmydutytodoitthoughitisinmypower’’:thiswouldcertainlyseemtocommonsenseanimmoralparadox。Andyetthereseemtobeactsandabstinenceswhichwepraiseasvirtuous，withoutimposingthemasdutiesuponallwhoareabletodothem；asforarichmantoliveveryplainlyanddevotehisincometoworksofpublicbeneficence。
Perhapswemayharmonisetheseinconsistentviewsbydistinguishingbetweenthequestions`whatamanoughttodoorforbear’
and`whatothermenoughttoblamehimfornotdoingorforbearing’:andrecognisingthatthestandardnormallyappliedindealingwiththelatterquestionislaxerthanwouldberightindealingwiththeformer。Buthowisthisdoublestandardtobeexplained？Wemaypartlyexplainitbythedifferentdegreesofourknowledgeinthetwocases:therearemanyactsandforbearancesofwhichwecannotlaydowndefinitelythattheyoughttobedoneorforborne，unlesswehavethecompleteknowledgeofcircumstanceswhichamancommonlypossessesonlyinhisowncase，andnotinthatofothermen。ThusImayeasilyassuremyselfthatIoughttosubscribetoagivenhospital:butIcannotjudgewhethermyneighbouroughttosubscribe，asIdonotknowthedetailsofhisincomeandtheclaimswhichheisboundtosatisfy。Idonot，however，thinkthatthisexplanationisalwaysapplicable:
Ithinkthattherearenotafewcasesinwhichwe。refrainfromblamingothersfortheomissionofactswhichwedonotdoubtthatweintheirplaceshouldhavethoughtitourdutytoperform。Insuchcasesthelineseemsdrawnbyamoreorlessconsciousconsiderationofwhatmenordinarilydo，andbyasocialinstinctastothepracticaleffectsofexpressedmoralapprobationanddisapprobation:wethinkthatmoralprogresswillonthewholebebestpromotedbyourpraisingactsthatareabovethelevelofordinarypractice，andconfiningourcensure——atleastifpreciseandparticular——toactsthatfallclearlybelowthisstandard。Butastandardsodeterminedmustbeinevitablyvague，andtendingtovaryastheaveragelevelofmoralityvariesinanycommunity，orsectionofacommunity:indeeditistheaimofpreachersandteachersofmoralitytoraiseitcontinually。
HenceitisnotconvenienttouseitindrawingatheoreticallinebetweenVirtueandDuty:andIhavethereforethoughtitbesttoemploythetermssothatvirtuousconductmayincludetheperformanceofdutyaswellaswhatevergoodactionsmaybecommonlythoughttogobeyondduty；thoughrecognisingthatVirtueinitsordinaryuseismostconspicuouslymanifestedinthelatter。
SofarIhavebeenconsideringtheterm`Virtuous’
asappliedtoconduct。Butboththisgeneralterm，andthenamesconnotingparticularvirtues——``just’’，``liberal’’，``brave’’，etc——areappliedtopersonsaswellastotheiracts:andthequestionmayberaisedwhichapplicationismostappropriateorprimary。Herereflection，Ithink，showsthattheseattributesarenotthoughtbyustobelongtoactsconsideredapartfromtheiragents:sothatVirtueseemstobeprimarilyaqualityofthesoulormind，conceivedaspermanentincomparisonwiththetransientactsandfeelingsinwhichitismanifested。Assoconceiveditiswidelyheldtobeapossessionworthaimingatforitsownsake；tobe，infact，apartofthatPerfectionofmanwhichisbysomeregardedasthesoleUltimateGood。ThisviewIshallconsiderinasubsequentchapter。MeanwhileitmaybeobservedthatVirtues，likeotherhabitsanddispositions，thoughregardedascomparativelypermanentattributesofthemind，areyetattributesofwhichwecanonlyformdefinitenotionsbyconceivingtheparticulartransientphenomenainwhichtheyaremanifested。IfthenweaskinwhatphenomenaVirtuouscharacterismanifested，theobviousansweristhatitismanifestedinvoluntaryactions，sofarasintentional；or，morebriefly，involitions。Andmany，perhapsmost，moralistswouldgivethisasacompleteanswer。IftheyarenotpreparedtoaffirmwithKantthatagoodwillistheonlyabsoluteandunconditionalGood，theywillatanyrateagreewithButlerthat``theobjectofthemoralfacultyisactions，comprehendingunderthatnameactiveorpracticalprinciples:thoseprinciplesfromwhichmenwouldactifoccasionsandcircumstancesgavethempower。’’
Andifitbeurgedthatmorethanthisisincluded(e。g。)intheChristianconceptionoftheVirtueofCharity，the``loveofourneighbour’’，theywillexplainwithKantthatbythislovewemustnotunderstandtheemotionofaffection，butmerelytheresolutiontobenefit，whichalonehas``truemoralworth’’。
Idonot，however，thinkthatthecompleteexclusionofanemotionalelementfromtheconceptionofVirtuewouldbereallyinharmonywiththecommonsenseofmankind。Ithinkthatinourcommonmoraljudgmentscertainkindsofvirtuousactionsareheldtobeatanyrateadornedandmadebetterbythepresenceofcertainemotionsinthevirtuousagent:thoughnodoubttheelementofvolitionisthemoreimportantandindispensable。ThustheVirtueofChastityorPurity，initshighestform，seemstoincludemorethanameresettledresolutiontoabstainfromunlawfullust；itincludessomesentimentofrepugnancetoimpurity。Again，werecognisethatbenefitswhichspringfromaffectionandarelovinglybestowedaremoreacceptabletotherecipientsthanthoseconferredwithoutaffection，inthetasteofwhichthereisadmittedlysomethingharshanddry:hence，inacertainway，theaffection，ifpracticalandsteady，seemsahigherexcellencethanthemerebeneficentdispositionofthewill，asresultinginmoreexcellentacts。InthecaseofGratitudeeventherigidityofKantseemstorelax，andtoadmitanelementofemotionasindispensabletothevirtue:andtherearevariousothernotions，suchasLoyaltyandPatriotism，whichitisdifficult——withoutparadox——eithertoexcludefromalistofvirtuesortointroducestrippedbareofallemotionalelements。
Aconsiderationofthecaseslastmentionedwillleadustoconcludethat，intheviewofCommonSense，thequestion(raisedintheprecedingchapter)，whetheranactisvirtuousinproportionasitwasdonefromregardfordutyorvirtue，mustbeansweredinthenegative:
forthedegreeinwhichanactdeservespraiseascourageous，loyal，orpatrioticdoesnotseemtobereducedbyitsbeingshownthatthepredominantmotivetotheactwasnaturalaffectionandnotloveofvirtueassuch。
IndeedinsomecasesIthinkitclearthatwecommonlyattributevirtuetoconductwhereregardfordutyorvirtueisnotconsciouslypresentatall:asinthecaseofaheroicactofcourage——letussay，insavingafellow-creaturefromdeathunderanimpulseofspontaneoussympathy。
Soagain，whenwepraiseamanas``genuinelyhumble’’wecertainlydonotimplythatheisconsciousoffulfillingaduty——stilllessthatheisconsciousofexhibitingavirtue——bybeinghumble。
